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When facts are in dispute, the enforcement of legal rights depends on
standards of proof. Such standards tell fact finders (who are seldom
completely certain of the facts) how to resolve issues of fact even though
they are uncertain. The typical standard in civil litigation is that the party to
whom the burden of persuasion is allocated must prove its contention by a
preponderance of the evidence. Wigmore doubted that verbal explanations
of the preponderance of the evidence standard were necessary, or even
helpful. He said that the “simple and suggestive phrase [preponderance of
the evidence] has not been allowed to suffice; and in many precedents sundry
other phrases—’satisfied,’ ‘convinced,’ and the like—have been put forward
as equivalents, and their propriety as a form of words discussed and
sanctioned or disapproved, with much waste of judicial effort.”1 If his
confidence in the clarity of the term was ever justified, it is no more.
“Preponderance” is at best an uncommon word nowadays. Moreover, issues
such as whether mathematical models should guide jury deliberations put
considerable strain on that “simple and suggestive phrase.”
Professor Ronald Allen has championed a comparative interpretation
of the preponderance test.2 In a recent article, Juridical Proof and the Best
Explanation,3 Professor Michael Pardo and Professor Allen offer a new
variation of the comparative model. They contend that, with respect to the
preponderance standard, judges should instruct jurors to “select the best
explanation of the evidence (or the most plausible version of the litigated
events) and that something has been proven by a preponderance of the
evidence if it is part of their selected explanation or version of events.”4 With
respect to summary judgments and judgments as a matter of law, they take
the position that “a judge ought to grant such a motion only if a jury would
have to find one side’s explanation more plausible than the other side’s

1

9 JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2498, at 325–26 (3d ed. 1940).
See, e.g., Ronald J. Allen, A Reconceptualization of Civil Trials, 66 B.U. L. REV. 401,
425–34 (1986); Ronald J. Allen, Rationality, Algorithms and Juridical Proof: A Preliminary
Inquiry, 1 INT’L J. EVIDENCE & PROOF 254, 273 (1997) (“[W]hen a plaintiff produces evidence
of some state or states of affair that are favourable to its claim, that is sufficient, until the
defense produces some to the contrary, and so on. This in turn means that legal proof is
comparative: the question is the relative plausibility of the parties’ cases; the question is not
the cardinal probability, conceived as a relative frequency or a subjective belief state, of a
certain state of affairs.”).
3
Michael S. Pardo & Ronald J. Allen, Juridical Proof and the Best Explanation, 27
LAW & PHIL. 223 (2007).
4
Id. at 266–67.
2
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explanation.”5
Even though Pardo and Allen advocate a comparative understanding of
the preponderance test, they accept a “typical” pattern jury instruction
explanation of the preponderance standard: “‘When you have considered all
the evidence in the case, you must be persuaded that it is more probably true
than not true.’”6 That does not sound particularly like a comparative
standard. It seems to fit better with a more conventional explanation of the
preponderance of the evidence standard, “Preponderance is not a
comparative standard as such: The question is not whether plaintiff’s case is
better than defendant’s, but whether the evidence makes the points that the
plaintiff must prove more probable than not.”7 The prime significance of the
difference between the two is that Pardo and Allen’s suggested instruction
on the preponderance of the evidence test would require jurors to find in
favor of the party with the burden of proof when the best explanation favored
that party, even though the jurors considered that explanation (or the
evidence that supported it) insufficient to warrant a verdict.8
5

Id. at 264–65.
Id. at 266 (quoting FEDERAL CIVIL JURY INSTRUCTIONS OF THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT 34).
7
“[T]his standard means the jury is persuaded (acting as reasonable persons) that the
points to be proved are more probably so than not. . . . At least in theory, it is satisfied if the
factfinder believes by the thinnest conceivable margin that the points to be proved are so, and
anything less would not be a standard of proof at all . . .” 1 CHRISTOPHER B. MUELLER & LAIRD
C. KIRKPATRICK, FEDERAL EVIDENCE § 3:5, at 437–38 (2007) (footnotes omitted). Often,
under a preponderance of the evidence standard, it is assumed that the trier of fact piles up the
evidence arguably on the plaintiff’s side and the evidence arguably on the defendant’s side
and determines which pile is greater. Cf. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 367–68 (1969) (noting
“the accuracy of the observation of commentators that ‘the preponderance test is susceptible
to the misinterpretation that it calls on the trier of fact merely to perform an abstract weighing
of the evidence in order to determine which side has produced the greater quantum, without
regard to its effect in convincing his mind of the truth of the proposition asserted” (quoting
Norman Dorsen & Daniel A. Rezneck, In Re Gault and the Future of Juvenile Law, 1 FAM.
L. Q. no. 4 (1967) at 26)). In fact, a more accurate notion of the preponderance of the evidence
standard is “evidence which as a whole shows that the fact sought to be proved is more
probable than not.” United States v. Montague, 40 F.3d 1251, 1254–55 (D.C. Cir. 1994)
(some citations and footnotes omitted). For a slightly different approach, see, for example, 2
MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 339 at 484 (Kenneth S. Broun, et al. 6th Practitioners ed. 2006)
(“The most acceptable meaning to be given to the expression, proof by a preponderance seems
to be proof which leads the jury to find that the existence of the contested fact is more probable
than its nonexistence. Thus the preponderance of evidence becomes the trier’s belief in the
preponderance of probability.”) (citing MODEL CODE OF EVIDENCE RULE 1.3; EDMUND
MORGAN, SOME PROBLEMS OF PROOF 8485 (1956)).
8
Neither of those two approaches fits well with the heuristic approach that many courts
and some commentators use, conceiving of a preponderance of evidence as anything greater
than 50%. Where “50%” is merely an analogy to a state of cognitive agnosticism (where the
trier finds no party’s evidence and argument superior to the others’), it becomes very
problematic when one considers questions such as those in the debates over the use of
mathematical models at trial and the sufficiency of so-called “naked” statistical evidence to
support a verdict.
6
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Moreover, their approach to summary judgments and other tests of the
sufficiency of the evidence does not seem to fit with the Supreme Court’s
opinions in Celotex Corporation v. Catrett,9 and Reeves v. Sanderson
Plumbing Products, Inc.10 Each of those cases permits the court to enter
judgment against the nonmoving party for insufficiency of evidence without
considering evidence and explanations in favor of the moving party.11 Of
course, it is not unknown for conventional approaches to be wrong, or
confused, and Pardo and Allen undoubtedly think that non-comparative
approaches to the preponderance tests are in error. This paper will argue that
the conventional understanding, viewed in light of studies of inference under
uncertainty, seems superior to the approach that Professors Pardo and Allen
take.
These flaws are unfortunate, because the theory Professors Pardo and
Allen advance is very interesting, particularly its reliance on inference to the
best explanation, a form of non-deductive reasoning.12 That is to say that
inference to the best explanation does not guarantee the truth of its
conclusions,13 although conclusions based upon it may well be adequately
warranted.14 (I will use the term “the Pardo/Allen Theory” to distinguish
their theory from the actual practice of inference to the best explanation, or
from scholarly commentary on that process with which they may not
agree.)15 They view the process of inference to the best explanation in
litigation as occurring in two steps. The first is generation of potential
explanations of the evidence—typically a process that the parties to a dispute
initiate, but one to which the fact finders contribute. Then the triers of fact
select “the best explanation from the list of potential ones as an actual
explanation or the truth.”16 While they rely on the reader’s intuitive sense of
what an explanation is, they note that the context in which one makes
9

477 U.S. 317 (1986).
530 U.S. 133 (2000).
11
Merely asserting that the non-moving party had insufficient evidence could not count
as an explanation, or else making an inference to the best explanation would merely mean
deciding in favor of the party with the best argument. In that case, inference to the best
explanation would not add anything to what we already know.
12
For illustrations see infra Section II, part A.
13
Pardo & Allen, supra note 3, at 227.
14
Gilbert H. Harman, The Inference to the Best Explanation, 74 PHIL. REV. 88, 90–91
(1965).
15
On possible differences between the Pardo/Allen theory and the process of inference
to the best explanation, see, for example, Larry Laudan, Strange Bedfellow: Inference to the
Best Explanation and the Criminal Standard of Proof, 11 INT’L J. EVIDENCE. & PROOF 292,
300 (2007) (contending that the reasonable doubt standard is not, contrary to Pardo and
Allen’s theory, consistent with inference to the best explanation because the reasonable doubt
standard prohibits a conviction where there is a reasonable explanation in favor of the
defendant, regardless of whether it is the best explanation)
16
Pardo & Allen, supra note 3, at 229.
10
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inferences will tend to suggest the characteristics of acceptable
explanations.17
Juridical Proof and the Best Explanation analyzes, as the title suggests,
the entire process of proof. In the process it naturally devotes significant
attention to the standards of proof. I will focus on the preponderance
standard since (i) it seems to be the standard of proof that would reflect
inference to the best explanation, if any does,18 and (ii) courts often pose it
in terms that might sound quantitative, for example, as requiring the party
bearing the burden to prove that its contentions are more likely than not the
case, or more likely so than not so.19
Formulations of the preponderance test in terms of likelihood or
probability, such as “When you have considered all the evidence in the case,
you must be persuaded that it is more probably true than not true,”20 have
tempted advocates of the use of mathematical models of evidence over the
last few decades to make the argument that statistical norms should govern
fact finding or formulation of evidentiary rules. Pardo and Allen’s piece is,
in significant part, a criticism of such models. Issues about the
preponderance standard arose most starkly in discussions of the sufficiency
of so-called “naked” or exclusively statistical evidence,21 often presented
through the “blue bus” hypothetical. Those discussions raised two specific
questions that are particularly salient here: First, what sort of superiority of
evidence (or inferences from it) is necessary for a preponderance of
evidence? Second, and related, what sort of superiority of evidence or
likelihood of inferences is necessary to justify a directed verdict or summary
judgment? I will argue that the Pardo/Allen theory’s response to each of
them is flawed.

17

Pardo & Allen, supra note 3, at 229 & n.17.
See, e.g., Laudan, supra note 15 at 300 (arguing that the reasonable doubt standard
does not reflect inference to the best explanation in that the reasonable doubt test requires a
verdict for the defense if any reasonable explanation would be in defendant’s favor).
19
1 MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra note 7, §3:5, at 437 n.4 (“It is irresistible [to] draw
an analogy to likelihood or comparative probability: 51-49 (or for that matter 50.001-49.999)
is enough.”).
20
Pardo & Allen, supra note 3, at 266 (quoting FEDERAL CIVIL JURY INSTRUCTIONS OF
THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT 34). Cf. Bourjailly v. United States, 483 U.S. 171, 175–76 (1987)
(discussing examples of “more likely than not” standard in preliminary factual issues for the
court).
21
See, e.g., Daniel Shaviro, Statistical-Probability Evidence and the Appearance of
Justice, 103 HARV. L. REV. 530, 543–44 (1989); David H. Kaye, Naked Statistical Evidence,
89 YALE L. J. 601 (1980) (reviewing MICHAEL FINKELSTEIN, QUANTITATIVE METHODS IN
LAW: STUDIES IN THE APPLICATION OF MATHEMATICAL PROBABILITY AND STATISTICS TO
LEGAL PROBLEMS (1978)).
18
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The Pardo/Allen theory has a great deal going for it. Juries can seldom
be certain about the truth.22 Their ability to resolve questions of fact under
such conditions of uncertainty depends on their selection and application of
cognitive strategies they have learned from their experience given limited
availability, time and cognitive resources. Pennington and Hastie’s work on
the story model was designed to delineate one such strategy, central to
understanding discourse, i.e., to the jury’s comprehension and assessment of
evidence,23 on which the Pardo/Allen theory relies, in part. Moreover, it is
undoubtedly true that jurors, who are at least outwardly passive, often rely
heavily on the parties’ gathering of evidence and formulation of theories, or
explanations of the evidence. When jurors have no reason to question the
adequacy of the evidence or of the hypotheses that the parties have
constructed to explain the evidence, then it makes perfect sense for jurors to
compare those hypotheses in the process of reaching their decision. In
addition, Professors Pardo and Allen make the telling point that more formal
theories of evidence and inference, in particular Bayes’ Theorem, depend in
unacknowledged ways on narrative and other accounts of causation. Finally,
their emphasis on comparison does not require that the fact finder consider
all of the evidence that might bear on the ultimate issue. Exhaustive
evaluation of evidence is utterly unworkable.24
Even so, Pardo and Allen’s analysis of the preponderance test seems to
fall short. Research on human cognition suggests that successful decision
makers employ strategies that sometimes call for an assessment of whether
the information they have on an issue is sufficiently complete to support a
decision, and to apply the default rule, or seek more information, when the
data at hand seem insufficient.25 Pardo and Allen’s position bars
22
I will use “jury,” “juror” or “jurors” to refer to fact finders in general, unless the
context clearly indicates otherwise.
23
See, e.g., Nancy Pennington & Reid Hastie, A Cognitive Theory of Juror Decision
Making: The Story Model, 13 CARDOZO L. REV. 519 (1991).
24
See Craig R. Callen, Rationality and Relevancy: Conditional Relevancy and
Constrained Resources, 2003 MICH. ST. L. REV. 1260–71.
25
Indeed, the story model itself posits that fact finders will consider the completeness of
evidence when asking whether they have enough confidence in the stories they construct to
support a verdict. Moreover, at least some scholars take the position that inference to the best
explanation requires that an explanation or hypothesis meet a threshold requirement of
plausibility (regardless of whether there are plausible competitors) before it can be considered
“best.” Laudan, supra note 15, at 304. Setting aside questions about the adequacy of an
information base for drawing conclusions, Josephson argues that inference to the best
explanation (or, as it is sometimes called, abduction) suggest that it must take account of two
possible explanations even if the parties fail to offer them: (i) that the evidentiary basis is false
(or just “noise”) and (ii) that some new explanation not yet formulated will be better. John
R. Josephson, On the Proof Dynamics of Inference to the Best Explanation, in THE DYNAMICS
OF LEGAL PROOF: COMPUTATION, LOGIC AND COMMON SENSE 287, 293 (Peter Tillers &
Marilyn MacCrimmon eds. 2002).
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consideration of the adequacy of evidence to support an explanation, so long
as one explanation seems to be better than any competitor. It is also
inconsistent with any requirement that fact finders consider whether some
unarticulated explanation might be better. Accordingly, as a descriptive
theory, it cannot fit with the extant summary judgment and judgment as a
matter of law standard, nor, in a real sense, does it seem consistent with the
requirement of proof by a preponderance.
The main point of this paper is to show that inference to the best
explanation provides an inadequate model of the preponderance standard if
it omits consideration of whether the plaintiff26 has offered sufficient
evidence and an adequate explanation to justify a finding in its favor,
regardless of the theories and evidence in defendant’s favor. Moreover, the
fact that the explanations in favor of plaintiff are better is necessary, but not
always sufficient to warrant a verdict in its favor. In contrast, research on
human problem solving (in conjunction with inference to the best
explanation) strongly supports judicial examination of sufficiency of the
evidence (primarily through motions for summary judgment and judgment
as a matter of law) and jurors’ consideration of the adequacy of evidence and
inferences to support a verdict.
In order to lay the groundwork for that argument, I have to discuss some
other research on evidence to which it responds, or on which I plan to build
it. First is a brief analysis of the utility of statistical evidence and models of
the process of proof, with particular attention to some descriptive and
prescriptive weaknesses. Mathematical models are, at best, normative at
very high levels of generality. As a guide to practical decisions, they fail to
recognize several realities of practical decision making, creating an irrational
model of rationality. The paper then summarizes the Pardo/Allen theory,
which is in fair part an attempt to formulate a theory of the proof process that
does not have the defects of mathematical models. Finally, the paper briefly
sketches a theory of the preponderance of the evidence that is more
consistent with research on cognition and with the legal significance of the
burden of persuasion than either mathematical models or Pardo and Allen’s
theory could be.

26

Again, I use the word “plaintiff” as short hand for the party with the burden of
persuasion, unless the context clearly indicates otherwise.
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I. ON QUANTIFICATION
The status of mathematical models of inference from evidence has been
a persistent issue in evidence scholarship over the last forty years or so.
Advocates of the use of mathematical models ranged from those who argued
that jurors should be taught to use statistics in the process of deliberation
about evidence that witnesses did not quantify,27 to what is probably the
predominant current view: that the models can be helpful for understanding
the inferential process, even though judges or jurors do not, and probably
cannot, use the models to evaluate specific pieces of evidence and their effect
on the verdict in the time available to them at trial.28 I will summarize the
reasons for skepticism about mathematical models here, only insofar as
Pardo and Allen’s work is a response to them—I have addressed
probabilistic modeling in its own right elsewhere.29
A surprising amount of the debate crystallized around a set of
hypotheticals. The best known is the Blue Bus case, one version of which
Professor Shaviro offered in the Harvard Law Review:30 plaintiff is hit by a
bus that she knows is blue but cannot otherwise describe. She establishes
that the defendant bus company operates eighty percent of all the blue buses
in the area. In the absence of other relevant evidence, this evidence
establishes an eighty percent chance that the bus company is liable. No one
thinks that a similar situation is likely to occur in real life. For example, it
seems unlikely that a plaintiff would ever testify that a bus hit her without
providing details such as the speed of the bus, her own conduct, and so forth.
The stakes for the academics involved in the debates over the blue bus
hypothetical were not limited to resolving such cases. The debates over the
blue bus example, and related exchanges over models based on Bayes’
Theorem, were really about the nature of inference under conditions of
uncertainty—the context in which almost all trials take place. Essentially,
the Bayesian idea was that our inferences from evidence can, and should,
conform to the principles of statistics, that we can use Bayes’ Theorem to
27
See Stephen E. Fienberg, & Mark J. Schervish, The Relevance of Bayesian Inference
for the Presentation of Statistical Evidence and for Legal Decisionmaking, 66 B.U. L. REV.
771, 792 (1986) (advocates of use of Bayesian model to train jurors).
28
E.g., Richard D. Friedman, Answering the Bayesioskeptical Challenge, 1 INT’L J.
EVIDENCE & PROOF 276, 289–91 (1997).
29
E.g., Craig R. Callen, Notes on a Grand Illusion: Some Limits on the Use of Bayesian
Theory in Evidence Law, 57 IND. L. J. 1 (1982); Craig R. Callen, Adjudication and the
Appearance of Statistical Evidence, 65 TUL. L. REV. 457 (1991); Craig R. Callen, Adams and
the Person in the Locked Room, 1 INTERNATIONAL COMMENTARY ON EVIDENCE (1998).
30
Daniel Shaviro, Statistical-Probability Evidence and the Appearance of Justice, 102
HARV. L. REV. 530, 530–31 (1989). He drew his hypothetical from Laurence H. Tribe, Trial
by Mathematics: Precision and Ritual in the Legal Process, 84 HARV. L. REV. 1329, 1340–41
(1971). Tribe adapted it from Smith v. Rapid Transit, Inc., 317 Mass. 469, 58 N.E.2d 754
(1945).
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test to guide, assess or represent inferential processes.31 In other words, their
argument was that the use of models demonstrated rational reasoning under
conditions of uncertainty (“rational” being a tricky word),32 or, at least, a
rational method for dealing with uncertainty.33
Now it seems only human to have a desire to try to calculate the odds
of guilt after receiving impressive statistical evidence (such as a positive
DNA test with a very low random match frequency).34 Even so, the premise
that we can, or should, conform to mathematical probability theory is subject
to some question. In that sense, the Blue Bus debates (or, more prosaically,
questions about the status of mathematical models) raise questions about
how we should resolve disputes of fact. And, given that the most common
expression of the preponderance of evidence standard is “more likely than
not,” or “more likely so than not so,” the preponderance standard is among
the likelier targets of mathematical modelers.
To illustrate the application of Bayes’ Theorem without a lot of
mathematics, assume the question is whether the defendant was the source
of blood that bears on the identity of the person who committed a crime.
Assume that a DNA test indicates that the sample and the defendant’s blood
yield the same results when subjected to certain probes. Only 1 in 100
randomly selected persons’ blood would have those same traits. The
frequency of lab error is 5%. Now, if the juror expressed her pre-DNA
assessment of the likelihood that defendant committed the crime in
numerical form, the following chart shows the results of applying Bayes’
Theorem.

31

One expression of Bayes’ Theorem is
P(B|A) =_____
________________P(B)* P(A|B)___________
[P(B) * P(A|B)] + [P(not-B) * P(A|not-B)]
where the probability that A is true is P(A), that A is false is P(not-A), and the probability that
A is true given that B is true is P(A|B). See Craig R. Callen, Notes on a Grand Illusion: Some
Limits on the Use of Bayesian Theory in Evidence Law, 57 IND. L. J. 1, 12–14 n. 46 (1982).
Further, (i) P(B) and P(not-B) must equal 1, (ii) P(A) must equal P(A&B) + P(A & not-B),
and (iii) P(A&B) must equal P(B) x .P(A|B). Craig R. Callen, Statistical Methods and a
Paradox of Forensic Expertise, in FORENSIC EXPERTISE AND THE LAW OF EVIDENCE 129, 130
n. 2 (1993).
32
See Richard Lempert, The New Evidence Scholarship: Analyzing the Process of Proof,
66 B.U. L. REV. 439, 452–53 (1986) (“[T]he law may be Bayesian rational without mandating
a fact-finding process that combines evidence with conformity with Bayes’s Theorem or its
underlying axioms.”).
33
See Richard D. Friedman, Answering the Bayesioskeptical Challenge, 1 INT’L J.
EVIDENCE & PROOF 276, 278 (1997) (“The conventional [Bayesian] theory is not contrived;
it reflects rational treatment of uncertainty based on intuitively appealing and experientially
successful premises.”).
34
E.g., 1 MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra note 7, §3:5, at 437 n.4 (“It is irresistible [to]
draw an analogy to likelihood or comparative probability: 51–49 (or for that matter 50.001–
49.999) is enough.”).
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In order to arrive at the probability of guilt without knowing about the
DNA evidence, one could ask what the likelihood of receiving the other
evidence would be if the defendant were guilty as compared to the likelihood
of innocence and set the initial probability of guilt accordingly.35 That is not
to say that there would be hard data on the probability of guilt based on nonquantified evidence—it is subjective. “Application of the conventional
probability theory to subjective probability assignments is the essence of
Bayesianism.”36 Professor Shaviro’s version of the hypothetical highlights
several of the problems with Bayesian models because it is such a stark
mathematical argument. First, Professor Shaviro’s view exemplified a
problem that Professor Tribe earlier called the “dwarfing of soft variables”37
when he argued that, absent other evidence, the court should direct a verdict
in favor of the plaintiff.38 Even assuming that the Blue Bus Co. operated
80% of blue buses in the area, there would be reasons to suppose that the
likelihood of liability would be less than market share—absent further
information. Thorough application of mathematical models would require
discounting for several reasons. For example, one must discount (i) for
possible errors in eyewitness identification,39 and (ii) to reflect that the
hypothetical presents few, if any, facts to show that the bus company
breached a duty to the plaintiff, or that, if it did so, its breach was the
proximate cause of the injury—a worrisome failure.40 In short, as Tribe
suggested might happen, the seeming ease of inference from the market share
35
See Pardo & Allen, supra note 3, at 247 n. 70; Callen, Notes on a Grand Illusion, supra
note 29, at 4–5. If the DNA evidence were the first evidence the jury received, one might set
the prior probability at .5, on the theory that the jurors would not know who had the better
case. See RICHARD A. POSNER, FRONTIERS OF LEGAL THEORY 372 (2001). There is a great
deal more discussion about prior probabilities in the literature, but it is largely beyond the
scope of this piece.
36
Richard D. Friedman, Answering the Bayesioskeptical Challenge, 1 INT’L J. EVIDENCE
& PROOF 276, 277 (1997).
37
Tribe, supra note 30 at 1361–62.
38
Shaviro, supra note 30, at 533.
39
See, e.g., Craig R. Callen, Cognitive Science and the Sufficiency of “Sufficiency of the
Evidence” Tests, 65 TUL. L. REV. 1113, 1127 (1991).
40
POSNER, supra note 35, at 371 n.66; Callen, Adjudication and the Appearance of
Statistical Evidence, supra note 29, at 473.
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led Shaviro to ignore other portions of the fact finding task that would not be
so easy to quantify.
Second, even if Professor Shaviro had developed an equation that
incorporated the soft variables, we simply do not (and probably cannot) think
about questions of fact as zealous Bayesians might wish.41 For example, in
order for human inferences to correspond to subjective probabilities, all of
our beliefs would have to be consistent, i.e., no contradictions or conflicts
would be permissible. All signs are that we do not have the cognitive
capacity to check all of our beliefs for latent conflicts. That is not to say that
we consciously entertain conflicts, such as believing at the same time that
Bush is president and that Gore is. But it is to say that, given the vast range
of experiences we have, the constraints on our decision-making resources,42
and the unlikelihood that avoiding latent inconsistencies would have a
significant payoff, there is no reason to suppose that we do, can, or should
keep our beliefs consistent.43 So there is substantial room for question about
the usefulness of subjective probability statements, particularly for decision
making in realistic conditions, i.e., real time.
Third, mathematical logic of the sort Bayesian models employ is
reversible. Suppose one calculates the probability of a conclusion as .67.
There is nothing in mathematical logic to prevent the calculator from
concluding that he or she simply applied the mathematical formula
incorrectly, developing a new equation (or reassigning probabilities) and
recalculating, until satisfied that the result seems reasonable, and that the
application of the theorem incorporates the relevant criteria.44
That is related to the fourth point. Advocates of the use of subjective
or personalist probability in conjunction with Bayes’ Theorem might
criticize the reversibility argument on the ground that it smacks too much of
manipulating the formula to procure a particular result. Probabilistic models
can only guide decisions well to the extent they reflect useful information
and the appropriate inferential relationships among items of data and the
41
E.g., Richard O. Lempert, Of Flutes, Oboes and the As If World of Evidence Law, 1
INT’L J. EVIDENCE & PROOF 316, 317 (1997).
42
Including time and cognitive capacity.
43
Professor Redmayne suggests that, given that we only have a limited number of beliefs
in play at any time, we may be able to limit checks for consistency to those beliefs. See Mike
Redmayne, Rationality, Naturalism and Evidence Law, 2003 MICH. ST. L. REV. 849, 864–65
(2003). Unless our beliefs are inherently probabilistic, however, in order for assignments of
probability to be reliable, they must be consistent with some well-founded beliefs about odds
formation, which we have tested in a number of other contexts. Since our everyday cognition
does not seem to be Bayesian in any comprehensive sense, Redmayne’s suggestion would
still be intractable.
44
Ronald J. Allen, On the Significance of Batting Averages and Strikeout Totals: A
Clarification of the “Naked Statistical Evidence” Debate, the Meaning of “Evidence,” and
the Requirement of Proof beyond a Reasonable Doubt, 65 TUL L. REV. 1093, 1110 (1991).
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conclusions to which they may point.
Nothing in an equation picks out one piece of data rather than another
as important, or even worth including. Instead, probabilistic formulae rest
on our experience, and we may have to adjust the fit of the formulae and the
experience so that they can work appropriately. Nor does anything in an
equation measure whether (i) the variables in the equation exhaust the types
of information that bear (or reasonably could bear) on the ultimate questions
or (ii) whether the evidence supporting the result of a probabilistic model is
as complete as one would expect. Research suggests that jurors do consider
completeness of the evidence in resolving questions of fact.45
Jurors would, indeed, be somewhat irrational if they did not ask
themselves not only whether the evidence was consistent with the parties’
contentions, but also whether the parties’ offers of evidence and hypotheses
to explain it were consistent with the social import of the issue confronting
them. To illustrate, consider a standard explanation for the intuition that the
facts in the blue bus hypothetical are insufficient to support a verdict: that
the absence of other evidence suggests that plaintiff did not bother making
such a search for other evidence. In such a situation, the statistical
information should be insufficient.46 If a Bayesian model yielded what
seemed to be an anomalous result and the decision maker noticed the absence
of such a consideration from the model, the decision maker could rationally
choose to reverse the process and reformulate the model. The key
consideration would be whether the model and the result seemed to fit the
decision-making process, not whether the decision maker adhered to the
model.
In some ways, debates over the utility of probabilistic models for fact
finding came to a critical point in an English case, Denis Adams (No.2).47
There, the Court of Appeal relied on its intuitive view of human decision
making (which empirical studies largely corroborate) to reject the use of
comprehensive Bayesian models in jury trials. An eminent statistician
testified in a rape trial and, in the process, provided the jury with a
questionnaire based on one Bayesian model48 of the factual issues posed by
45

See, e.g., Pennington & Hastie, supra note 23.
See, e.g., David H. Kaye, The Paradox of the Gatecrasher and Other Stories, 1979
ARIZ. ST. L. J. 101, 107–09; Tribe, supra note 30, at 1349–50. Cf. POSNER, supra note 35, at
371–72 (making argument at lower ratios).
47
R. v Adams (Denis John) (No. 2) [1998] 1 Crim. App. 377.
48
The model that Professor Donnelly employed was only one of any number of possible
models of the fact-finding task. To illustrate: the transcript of the judgment reproduces a
portion of the trial judge’s summing up. According to the judge, one of the prosecution
experts, identified only as Mr. Lambert, raised doubts about the questionnaire, on the grounds
that it did not cover “all the relevant evidence or all that [the jury] might think was relevant.”
Id. at 381. The trial judge himself pointed out that the questionnaire did not “include a box”
in which the jury might take account of “Adams’ own evidence and how he gave it.” Id. at
46
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both quantified and unquantified evidence in Adams’ case,49 and explained
to them how they might use it to calculate the likelihood of Adams’ guilt.
Adams was convicted of rape. The trial judge, the Court of Appeal
said, had “made it abundantly plain to the jury that if they found the Bayesian
approach helpful then they were at complete liberty, having had it explained
to them, to use it in their deliberations.”50 The judgment went on, however,
to hold that the trial judge should not have admitted the evidence at all. The
Adams judgment is emphatic that a trial court should exclude such evidence
in a case “lacking special features” absent there (or here).51 “[E]xpert
evidence should not be admitted to induce juries to attach mathematical
values to probabilities arising from nonscientific evidence adduced at
trial.”52
As the Court of Appeal read it, the statistician’s questionnaire omitted
some evidence and arguments that the jury might have wished to credit, and
might have included other lines of thought that they would have
disregarded.53 The victim in Adams had failed to identify the defendant as
her attacker in an identity parade. The trial court mentioned that failure in
summing up the evidence.54 The Court of Appeals noted that jurors might
well ask themselves about the identification and about the significance of
Adams’ own evidence,55 another apparent omission from the questionnaire.56
Fifth, Bayesian models of fact finding are difficult to square the notion
of proof of elements of a claim by a preponderance of evidence with
mathematical models. Suppose a claim has four elements, and the truth of
each is independent of the others. Further, suppose that, according to an
interpretation that is standard for Bayesians57 and many others, a
381–82.
49
Id. at 380.
50
Id.
51
Id. at 385.
52
Adams (Denis John) (No. 2) [1998] 1 Crim. App. at 385.
53
It might seem that jurors could ignore the boxes for arguments that they did not
consider worth their attention. That argument would conflict with a number of assumptions
that seem to underlie the defendant’s use of Professor Donnelly. Arguing that jurors might
disregard arguments to which Professor Donnelly’s questionnaire referred, and attempt to use
the questionnaire without relying on them, assumes that the jury has considerable
sophistication in statistics. Yet, if the jury has such knowledge, it is not clear why Professor
Donnelly’s testimony should be admissible. In addition, jurors who were inclined to defer to
the expert witness’ knowledge of logic might be very reluctant to set aside lines of thought
that he suggested. In any event, jurors who lacked statistical sophistication would have
difficulty deciding whether they could ignore an item in the questionnaire without conflict
with the underlying mathematical model.
54
Adams (Denis John) (No. 2) [1998] 1 Crim. App. at 382.
55
Id. at 384–85.
56
Id. at 382.
57
Friedman, supra note 28, at 278 (“This, of course, is the familiar ‘more likely than
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preponderance is any probability greater than .5. So, according to
mathematical theory, plaintiff could show four elements by just more than
.5, and the probability of their conjunction would be roughly one sixth, or
.514.
There are two ways to reconcile that requirement with the
preponderance standard, each of which is problematic. One can read the
preponderance standard to apply only to the conjunction, which means that
the probability of each element of a two element claim should be more than
.7 (on average) and of a three element claim, more than .8. It is difficult to
see why the number of elements should affect the burden of persuasion for
each or why the burden should be as high as .7 given the typical instruction.
Alternatively, one might say that the jury need only believe that a set of
evidence that shows all of the elements of the claim is more likely than .5 to
be accurate. That argument saves, in a sense, mathematical models, but only
by stipulating that they cannot be used for anything more detailed than a
global assessment of the evidence.58
One final argument is important for my discussion of the Pardo/Allen
theory. What is called the reference class problem in probabilistic models
reinforces the importance of experience as a foundation for the application
of logic. In the blue bus case above, the class of buses in town may not be
the most appropriate one for assessing the likelihood of liability. Instead, it
may be preferable to ask what percentage of the vehicles that the plaintiff
would identify as blue buses are owned and operated by the defendant, what
percentage of vehicles that hit people are owned by the defendant, what
percentage of the buses on the relevant street are blue, or what percentage of
vehicles that the plaintiff would identify as blue buses that drive on the
relevant street are defendant’s.59 Probabilistic logic does not tell us which
reference class is optimal, or how picky we should be about reference
classes. Certainly, as Professors Pardo and Allen have pointed out, if we
built a probabilistic model that took account of all possibly relevant factors,
gathered all of the information relating to those factors and sought to
calculate the probability of liability, and applied that model correctly, the
result would be a probability of liability of either 1.0 (certainly liable) or 0.0
not,’ or ‘balance of probabilities,’ standard.”).
58
One Bayesian has argued that jury instructions tend to be ambiguous on the question
of whether the plaintiff must prove each element of the claim by a preponderance, or just the
conjunction of them. Dale A. Nance, A Comment on the Supposed Paradoxes of a
Mathematical Interpretation of the Logic of Trials, 66 B.U. L. REV. 947, 949 (1986). That
seems overstated. He cites as ambiguous an instruction that says, in pertinent part, “If the
proof should fail to establish any essential element of plaintiff’s claim by a preponderance of
the evidence in the case, the jury should find for the defendant.” Id. (quoting E. DEVITT & C.
BLACKMAR, FEDERAL JURY PRACTICE AND INSTRUCTIONS § 71.14 (3d ed. 1977)).
59
Ronald J. Allen & Michael S. Pardo, The Problematic Value of Mathematical Models
of Evidence, 36 J. LEG. STUD. 107, 109 (2007).
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(certainly not liable).60 Absent that information, Bayesians must confront
the question of the appropriateness of the reference classes to which their
models refer. There is no mathematical way to answer that question.
That concern is related to a phrase that keeps popping up in cases and
commentary. Debates over blue bus hypotheticals often touched on the
status of “naked”61 or “solely”62 statistical evidence, and whether it is
sufficient to support a verdict. Discussions of the question are confusing,
because the distinction between naked statistics and other sorts of evidence
is ill-founded. A “naked” or “sole” statistic would simply be a number, with
no information about what it quantified, or the context in which one might
make inferences based on it. There would be no reason to regard it as
probative of anything.63 Reluctance to premise a verdict on a statistic such
60

Pardo & Allen, supra note 3, at 260. [
See Kaye, supra note 21.
62
See Shaviro, supra note 30, at 545.
63
See, e.g., Callen, Adjudication, supra note 29, at 466–69. To adapt a famous thought
experiment by Professor John Searle,
61

Suppose we were to conduct an experiment in which I sat in a
locked room with a personal computer and an instruction
manual. At some point, I received an e-mail message listing
“G” as a conclusion, and designating four or five other
variables as evidence. I then consulted the manual and sent a
message with a series of questions derived from the instructions
therein, such as “What is P(A|G)?”. On receiving a response
stipulating mathematical values in response to each question, I
inserted them into a spreadsheet according to the directions in
the manual, and depressed the enter key. On reading the result,
0.563, I then transmitted it as an e-mail message to my
unknown correspondent. Would my role (as compared to that
of, e.g, a person sending me e-mail messages) be fairly
described as fact-finding or problem-solving?
Craig R. Callen, Adams and the Person in the Locked Room, 1 INT’L COMMENTARY ON
EVIDENCE: iss. 1, art. 3., at 3–4 (1998). There seems to be no reasonable argument that my
response to the formal symbols would constitute fact-finding. Hence, there is a good deal
more to fact-finding than formal logic. Searle originally sought to show that a formal logical
system cannot accurately duplicate human thought. Searle took the position that digital
computers cannot understand what they are doing solely on the basis of computer programs,
because complying with formal procedures does not constitute thought. Instead it is merely
a matter of manipulating meaningless symbols without semantic content. JOHN SEARLE,
MINDS, BRAINS AND SCIENCE 36 (1984). He later refined that point, arguing that a computer
running a program would not thereby be intelligent because the computer would be incapable
of interpreting its own operations to refer to the world. JOHN R. SEARLE, THE MYSTERY OF
CONSCIOUSNESS 14–15 (1997). For a similar argument, see TERRENCE W. DEACON, THE
SYMBOLIC SPECIES: THE CO-EVOLUTION OF LANGUAGE AND THE BRAIN 444–45 (1997). If
the person sending me email messages were instead to refer, for example, to the likelihood
that the defendant’s bus negligently struck the plaintiff, instead of P(N), then I would have
some degree of awareness of the possible application of my work. Even then I could hardly
be said to have done the fact-finding, since I could not seek or exclude evidence to which the
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as the percentage of blue buses in town has less to do with whether the
evidence is naked than it has to do with questions such as (i) whether the
statistic refers to the correct reference class, since blue busses might not be
uniformly distributed through the area,64 (ii) whether reliance on statistical
evidence would promote or hinder the purposes of the substantive law,65 and
(iii) whether such reliance would give other plaintiffs incentives to refrain
from further investigation or submission of evidence.66 Some courts have
thought that they confronted the issue of whether they should permit a verdict
based on “naked” statistical evidence, but they had a great deal more
information than a single, solitary number. Generally the question in such
cases was whether, when the evidence would not be sufficient to support a
verdict without the statistical probability evidence, the evidence would be
sufficient if the statistical information were added.67 One of the issues likely
to arise in any such situation is whether the proponent of the evidence
established an adequate factual foundation for it, which is closely related to,
if not the same as, the reference class issue.
II. INFERENCE TO THE BEST EXPLANATION
A. Everyday Life and Sherlock Holmes
In response to the flaws in mathematical models, particularly as they
relate to jury decision making in practice, Professors Pardo and Allen sought
to offer an alternative grounded in a better description of fact finders’
decision making processes at trial. The Pardo/Allen theory focuses on
inference to the best explanation. Inference to the best explanation is not an
uncommon process, although few of us who use it think of it in those terms.68
So I will digress slightly to offer a few illustrations of it.
At my gym one night, I was walking past a man who was talking loudly
into a cell phone and said “Four foot long turkey and three foot long ham.
I’m on my way.” The first idea (technically a hypothesis or explanation) that
popped into my head was that the man was discussing a topic that related to
some very large farm products. I quickly realized that there was another
instructions referred. In other words, at best, mathematical models of reasoning under
uncertainty rely heavily on the decision maker’s use of her experience to identify, organize,
and assess relevant evidence. That ability is not itself mathematical, and reliance on it may,
in some senses, render the statistical results at best, a summary of underlying inferences rather
than a guide for inference.
64
Pardo & Allen, supra note 3, at 260 & n. 121.
65
Pardo & Allen, supra note 3, at 260 & n. 121.
66
See, e.g., Hart v. Sec’y of Health and Human Services, 60 Fed. Cl. 598, 607 (2004).
See Callen, Adjudication, supra note 33, at 497–98.
67
E.g., Baker v. Bridgestone/Firestone Co., 966 F. Supp. 874, 876 (W.D. Mo. 1996).
68
See generally Harman, supra note 14.
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possible explanation: that he was on his way to pick up four foot long turkey,
and three foot-long ham, sandwiches. My recall of an additional piece of
information, that Jimmy John’s Sandwiches was around the corner, seemed
to strengthen that hypothesis. Moreover, had he been on his way to pick up
a four foot long turkey, he would probably have said “a four foot long
turkey,” or in the case of the ham “a three foot long ham.” Taking a more
whimsical view, given that everyone was getting pretty tired of the Super
Tuesday stories in the media, a four foot long turkey or a three foot long ham
would probably have been the lead story on the local television news, and I
had seen no such story.69
In effect, I used inference to the best explanation, in that I started with
some pieces of information, generated some explanations from it, assessed
the quality of those explanations, chose the best one, and accepted it for my
purposes. In the process, I unconsciously searched my memory for other
information relating to the hypothesis, in this case, information about the
location of a sandwich shop, grammar, and the typical size of farm animals.70
While Pardo and Allen do not mention it (and may not be too fond of
Holmes),71 inference to the best explanation has a relatively unique
distinction among theories of inference: a relatively standard fictional source
of illustrations, Arthur Conan Doyle’s Sherlock Holmes. Citations to
Holmes seem to be fairly common in academic scholarship on the relation
of inference to the best explanation to fact finding and investigation.72
Criminologists use the fictional Holmes’ methods, and may acknowledge
him as a source of ideas and useful techniques.73 Charles Peirce originated
the concept of abduction, which is closely related, if not identical, to
inference to the best explanation.74 Professor David Schum noted Peirce was
69
There were other alternatives, including the possibility that he was seeking to obtain
the services of bad child actors, selected by size.
70
See Harman, The Inference to the Best Explanation, supra note 14, at 89.
71
For fairly strong criticism of the Holmes stories’ depiction of circumstances in which
he “probably should be wrong and he isn’t,” see, for example, D. Michael Risinger, Boxes in
Boxes: Julian Barnes, Conan Doyle, Sherlock Holmes and the Edalji Case, 4 INT’L
COMMENTARY ON EVIDENCE iss. 2, art. 3, at 13 (2006), http://www.bepress.com/ice/vol4/iss
2/art3/; Richard Posner, CSI: Baker Street, THE NEW REPUBLIC (Oct. 11, 2004), http://www.t
nr.com/doc.mhtml?i=20041011&s=posner101104.
72
See, e.g., David A Schum, Species of Abductive Reasoning in Fact Investigation in
Law, in THE DYNAMICS OF JUDICIAL PROOF: COMPUTATION, LOGIC AND COMMON SENSE 307,
314 (Marilyn MacCrimmon & Peter Tillers, eds., 2003); Thomas A. Sebeok & Jean UmikerSebeok, “You Know My Method”: A Juxtaposition of Charles S. Peirce and Sherlock Holmes,
in THE SIGN OF THREE: DUPIN, HOLMES, PEIRCE 11 (Umberto Eco & Thomas A. Sebeok, eds.,
1983).
73
Marcello Truzzi, Sherlock Holmes: Applied Social Psychologist, in THE SIGN OF
THREE, supra note 72, at 55, 57–58.
74
Peirce is often credited as the originator of abduction. “Abductive inference is widely
taken to be the same as inference to the best explanation.” DOUGLAS WALTON, ABDUCTIVE
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writing at the same time that Conan Doyle wrote the Holmes stories. Schum
observed that Holmes’ “investigative strategies seem almost identical to the
concept of abductive reasoning described by Peirce.” Nevertheless, “there
is no evidence that Peirce and Conan Doyle ever shared ideas on the
subject.”75 Illustrations from Conan Doyle may be more dramatic than
typical abduction is, and, indeed, Holmes was not too critical of his own
hypotheses. Even so, as illustrations of the importance of explanations, they
work pretty well.
One of Conan Doyle’s shorter stories illustrates a typical characteristic
of hypotheses that compete to be the best explanation—they are usually
causal. Conan Doyle76 wrote a story entitled How Watson Learned the Trick,
which was prepared as a miniature book for the Queen’s doll house’s
library.77 In that story, Sherlock Holmes’ companion, Dr. Watson, sought to
demonstrate his mastery of Holmes’ “trick,” the ability to draw correct
conclusions from seemingly inconsequential matters. He announced his
conclusion that Holmes was preoccupied upon arising that morning, based
on Watson’s observation that Holmes was unshaven. Further, Watson
inferred that Holmes had been unsuccessful in an investigation for a client
named Barlow, based on the fact that Watson saw Holmes open an envelope
with the name Barlow on it and groan. Watson also believed that Holmes
had taken up financial speculation because he turned to the financial section
and uttered an exclamation of interest. Finally, Watson concluded that
Holmes expected an important visitor momentarily because Holmes was
wearing his coat rather than a dressing gown.
Although Holmes applauded Watson’s initiative, he told Watson that
he did not yet have the trick. Holmes was wearing his coat in anticipation of
his forthcoming visit to his dentist, Barlow, whose letter had just confirmed
the time for Holmes’ appointment, resulting in the groan. The financial page
was next to the cricket scores, and Holmes was interested in Surrey’s
outcome against Kent. Finally, Holmes was unshaven because he sent his
razor out to be sharpened.78 Each part of each explanation rested on a causal
link, in that it suggested a cause for the evidence.
Watson, of course, was the character Conan Doyle used as Holmes’
foil, and it would not have done for Watson to master Holmes’ method, even
REASONING 34 (2004).
75
Schum, supra note 72, at 314.
76
Umberto Eco has done a good deal of work on abduction (which many theorists regard
as another name for inference to the best explanation, and vice versa). He cites Holmes as an
exemplar of abduction. Umberto Eco, Horns, Hooves, Insteps: Some Hypotheses on Three
Types of Abduction, in THE SIGN OF THREE, supra note 72, at 198, 215–20.
77
ARTHUR CONAN DOYLE, How Watson Learned the Trick, in THE RETURN OF
SHERLOCK HOLMES 324 (Richard L. Green ed., 1993).
78
Id. at 325–26.
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though Doyle referred to that method as nothing but “systematized common
sense.”79 The story does, however, depict the use of explanations to assess
evidence and draw conclusions from it, along with an implicit suggestion
that the method is not infallible.
Another Holmes story suggests that an explanation may, in fact, show
that some characteristics of a situation may be probative when we might, if
we failed to formulate the explanation, consider those aspects of no
inferential value. In Doyle’s story, The Silver Blaze, Holmes solves a
mystery, in large part, because a possible explanation suggested that
evidence might be relevant. In that story, Holmes was trying to determine
how a racehorse had disappeared. He surmised that the disappearance might
have been part of a plot to prevent the horse from winning a race, by making
a slight cut in the horse’s tendon. Assuming that someone as careful as the
perpetrator would not undertake the operation without practice, he asked
whether some nearby sheep were in good condition, found out that they had
become lame without any particular reason, and regarded that as
confirmation of his hypothesis.80
On its face, the condition of the sheep would have little bearing on the
horse snatching. If, however, Holmes had in mind a possible theory about
the perpetrator’s motive, then the sheep’s condition would become relevant.
It is important to note here, by the way, that the point of these illustrations is
not to argue or even suggest that jurors always, or often, engage in processes
as dramatic or as risky as Holmes’. Nor, when jurors are considering
explanations as surprising as Holmes’ often are, should they probe them as
little as Holmes seems to do. As Umberto Eco pointed out, detectives can
afford to take more chances in abduction than scientists can,81 and given their
relative roles, jurors as the final authority must exercise more caution than
detectives. “The greatest weakness in Holmes’ applications of inference—
at least as Watson related them to us—was Holmes’ failure to test the
hypotheses which he obtained through abduction.”82 On the other hand,
however, jurors do routinely evaluate the quality of the explanations or
stories83 that the parties advance for the evidence, and it is their job (as it was
not Watson’s) to analyze the stories critically.
79

ARTHUR CONAN DOYLE, The Blanched Soldier, in THE CASE-BOOK OF SHERLOCK
HOLMES 151, 169 (W.W. Robson, ed. 1993).
80
ARTHUR CONAN DOYLE, Silver Blaze, in THE MEMOIRS OF SHERLOCK HOLMES, 3, 23,
28 (Christopher Roden ed. 1993).
81
Umberto Eco, Horns, Hooves, Insteps: Some Hypotheses on Three Types of Abduction,
in THE SIGN OF THREE: DUPIN, HOLMES, PEIRCE 198, 220 (Umberto Eco & Thomas A. Sebeok
eds., 1983).
82
Marcello Truzzi, Sherlock Holmes: Applied Social Psychologist in THE SIGN OF
THREE, supra note 72, at 55, 70.
83
Or theories, or hypotheses.
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B. Inference to the Best Explanation in the Pardo/Allen Theory
1. Professors Pardo and Allen on the Basics of Inference to the
Best Explanation
Pardo and Allen contended that attention to what they refer to as
“explanatory considerations” would “provide a better account of micro-level
proof issues regarding the relevance and probative value of evidence . . .
which justifies the open ended nature” of rules such as Federal Rules 401
and 403.84 The Pardo/Allen theory, they say, offers an alternative protocol
for inferences from the evidence that may, in turn, produce conclusions that
are better justified than those that mathematical models may yield.85 Further,
they argued that explanatory considerations afford a better view of standards
of proof such as the preponderance test than conventional theory does, and
concomitantly, a better justification for various sorts of motions that allow
the court to rule against the party with the burden of proof when evidence is
insufficient or fails to support a verdict adequately.86
Explanations, they say, are prior to inference from evidence, and also
help to direct it, in the sense that explanations help to assess the likelihood
of particular hypotheses or conclusions. Pardo and Allen depict the process
of inference to the best explanation as involving two steps: first, generation
of hypotheses or explanations and, second, selection of the best explanation
from among the potential hypotheses. When it comes to formulation the
“domain of the inferential task,” which probably means our knowledge and
experience with the subject matter of the questions at hand, will help us
formulate explanations of data and, at the same time, constrain us from
relying too much on sheer imagination.87 In legal disputes, the substantive
law requires that the parties address certain facts, and successful
explanations must pertain to one or more of those facts. As Pardo and Allen
see it, the only limits on the generation of hypotheses that address those
critical facts are the limits of the creativity of the parties, the court, and the
jurors.88
The second phase of inference to the best explanation, in the authors’
eyes, involves a comparison of explanations and choice of the best one. They
cite criteria for choice such as the extent to which a hypothesis (i) is simple;
84

Pardo & Allen, supra note 3, at 225–26.
Pardo & Allen, supra note 3, at 225.
86
Pardo & Allen, supra note 3, at 226.
87
Pardo & Allen, supra note 3, at 229. As they point out, explanations that serve for a
chemist will not serve for a musical composer, so that acceptability of hypotheses may be a
function of the decision maker’s cognitive interest. Pardo & Allen, supra note 3, at 229–30.
Non-law disciplines are not of much interest here, although the jurors’ cognitive interest does
have some importance.
88
Pardo & Allen, supra note 3, at 230.
85
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(ii) accounts for numerous and diverse pieces of evidence; (iii) fits with our
general knowledge, or “background beliefs;” and (iv) is systematic rather
than makeshift.89 That measure of the quality of an explanation is contested.
For example, one philosopher sets a higher bar: as a threshold for acceptance
as the best account of the facts, a hypothesis must (i) “explain . . . different
kinds of facts; (ii) possess “simplicity” (a quality inversely related to “the
number and nature” of the assumptions on which the hypothesis’s
explanatory power depends); (iii) exhibit analogies with other explanations
known to be successful and (iv) “strongly cohere” with more basic or
“background” beliefs.90
Pardo and Allen argue that decision-makers who are choosing among
explanations will choose the hypothesis that best explains the aspects of
evidence that are most of interest to them. So, for example, if we are
considering the explanation “the butler did it,” that is helpful if we wonder
who committed a murder, but much less useful as an explanation if the
question is whether the dining room silver was laid out in a precise pattern.91
Finally, in explaining the force of explanations, they note that there is
something of a circularity. As they conceive of explanations, an explanation
can help us to understand facts, and yet the facts also tend to make the
explanation seem more accurate. They argue that the circularity “is not
vicious or problematic” but merely an accurate description of human
inferential practice.92
2. Inference to the Best Explanation and Sufficiency of
Evidence
Turning to trials, they argue that the parties are primarily responsible
for generating theories or hypotheses to explain the evidence. Those with
the burden of persuasion must address all of the elements of the claim or
defense; their opponents may address fewer since a verdict in their favor on
one will defeat their opponent. Parties may offer alternative explanations,
and triers of fact may develop explanations of their own.93 Once the
hypotheses are formulated, Pardo and Allen believe that the triers of fact
89

Pardo & Allen, supra note 3, at 230.
Laudan, supra note 15, at 294 (2007) (discussing the views of Paul Thagard). In his
seminal article on inference to the best explanation, after mentioning most of the
considerations that the authors list, Professor Harman wrote, “I do not wish to deny that there
is a problem about explaining the exact nature of these considerations; I will not, however,
say anything more about this problem.”
91
Pardo & Allen, supra note 3, at 232–33.
92
Pardo & Allen, supra note 3, at 233. It is not clear how this circularity is consistent
with the ability of the fact finder to evolve theories on his or her own.
93
Pardo & Allen, supra note 3, at 234. In addition, see the discussion of St. Mary’s,
infra note 192 and accompanying text.
90
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choose the most plausible,94 accepting it as accurate and finding in favor of
the party that the explanation supports. They rely on the work of Pennington
and Hastie, which argues that jurors reach their conclusions through the
construction and assessment of stories in terms of criteria such as internal
consistency, completeness, and uniqueness.95 Once again, in determining
the extent of detail necessary for hypotheses and the facts that they should
explain, the substantive law and the contentions of the parties will determine
the contours that a hypothesis must map in order to be helpful. Where stories
differ in terms of details that do not matter or at least are not critical, Pardo
and Allen argue that triers of fact may aggregate the stories in order to assess
the likelihood of critical facts.96
Sometimes, however, development of a good theory may be more
difficult. Noting that cases may occur in which “neither party offers a
particularly plausible explanation of the evidence, either because neither side
can explain key pieces of evidence or because there is such a paucity of
evidence that it can be explained in multifarious ways,” none of which is
better, or more likely, than its rivals.97 According to the authors, the
comparative aspect of their theory requires a verdict in the first case (where
no explanation offered or constructed is particularly plausible) unless no
explanation is of better quality than the others.98 If the explanations are all
of the equivalent quality, then the party with the burden of persuasion would
fail to meet it. If the evidence was so thin that it did not permit the trier to
distinguish among explanations, the party with the burden of persuasion
would, once again, have failed.99 As the authors note, summary judgments
and judgments as a matter of law are among the means of enforcing the
94
The authors probably mean to use “most plausible” as the equivalent of “best,”
although they do not specify the significance of plausibility. Some writers on abduction
consider plausibility a tricky concept. See Appendix B: Plausibility, in ABDUCTIVE
INFERENCE: COMPUTATION, PHILOSOPHY, TECHNOLOGY 266–67 (John R. Josephson & Susan
G. Josephson eds., 1996). I do not understand Pardo and Allen to be staking out a position in
that debate.
95
Pardo & Allen, supra note 3, at 234 & n. 35. In discussing uniqueness, Pennington
and Hastie say that the availability of multiple explanations for the evidence will weaken
belief in one over the others. On the other hand, if there is only one story that satisfies the
criteria of consistency, completeness, and uniqueness, jurors will tend to use it in reaching
their decision. See Nancy Pennington & Reid Hastie, A Cognitive Model of Juror Decision
Making: The Story Model, 13 CARDOZO L. REV. 519, 528–29 (1991).
96
Pardo & Allen, supra note 3, at 235–37. The Pardo/Allen theory would also
accommodate aggregation of alternative defenses, such as “I didn’t do it. But if I did, it was
in self-defense. And if it wasn’t in self-defense, I was coerced to do it.” Pardo & Allen, supra
note 3, at 256. Authors devote little attention to that possibility since they doubt that
defendants are likely to use such an approach.
97
Pardo & Allen, supra note 3, at 237–38.
98
That assumes, of course, that at least one of the explanations of equivalent quality
favors each party.
99
Pardo & Allen, supra note 3, at 238.
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burdens of proof—in particular the burden of production.100
Having looked at the process of proof in civil cases (and in other
situations not relevant here) Pardo and Allen turn briefly to the relationship
of the Pardo/Allen theory to rules of evidence, revisiting their somewhat
circular theory of the relationship between evidence and explanation (that
explanations explain evidence, which, in turn, makes the explanations seem
more accurate). Relevant evidence, they say, is evidence that the offering
party’s explanation explains (assuming that the explanation bears on a fact
that the substantive law considers important). Probative value, they argue,
is the extent to which an explanation explains the available evidence.101
3. Objections to the Pardo/Allen Theory
After they set out the degree to which they believe their conception of
inference to the best explanation is reflected in fact-finding, Pardo and Allen
turn to possible objections to it. One such objection102 is that the choice of
an explanation as “best” is too subjective. They argue that criteria such as
the degree to which the hypothesis explains the evidence are objective and
that the prevalence of inference to the best explanation in problem-solving
suggests that such practices have been successful over time and in a number
of contexts.103
Pardo and Allen freely concede that there is no guarantee that the
explanation that the Pardo/Allen theory requires the decision maker to select
as the best is, in fact, true. If an argument in deductive logic is valid, and the
premises of that argument are true, the conclusion must be.104 But factfinding at trial seldom turns on deductive arguments. Instead, reasoning at
trial almost always involves premises that, even if true, do not guarantee the
truth of the conclusion to which they lead. So, for example, a juror might
believe that it is difficult to see a traffic light suspended over an intersection
if the sun is setting behind it, and a witness might testify that she saw a red
light even though she was facing into the setting sun, but that would not
100

Pardo & Allen, supra note 3, at 238 n.42.
Pardo & Allen, supra note 3, at 241–42.
102
I will not recapitulate objections from the philosophy of science, which do not seem
to have much bearing on the preponderance standard.
103
Pardo & Allen, supra note 3, at 23.
104
Of course, if the premises of a deductive argument are wrong, then the conclusion may
be as well. For example, the following deductive argument is perfectly valid, yet its
conclusion is inaccurate:
101

The sky is green.
All things that are green are on Mars. Therefore, the sky is on Mars.
See, e.g., WILLARD V. O. QUINE, PHILOSOPHY OF LOGIC 50–52 (1970); Craig R. Callen, Notes
on a Grand Illusion, supra note 29, at 4–5 & n. 21.
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necessarily require the conclusion that she did not see the light. On the other
hand, if the juror concluded that the witness was accurate, and if the
applicable law held that the motorist was negligent for driving ahead despite
the red light, the deduction would require the conclusion that the driver was
negligent.105 Their point is that, if we cannot rely exclusively on deductive
logic to guide fact-finding, we must accept the possibility that our
conclusions will be in error. The Pardo/Allen theory, they contend, is no
greater potential source of error than any other logic that is inductive, that is,
that seeks to guide inferences from the evidence that is inconclusive.106
Readers familiar with the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence on scientific
evidence, among others, will recall the stress that the philosopher Karl
Popper, on whom the Court relied in Daubert v. Merrell Dow
Pharmaceuticals,107 put on testing as a justification for inference. Pardo and
Allen take the position that the parties test explanations of evidence through
cross-examination and submission of rebuttal evidence.108 Further, if the
defendant109 fails to adequately oppose a hypothesis in favor of the plaintiff,
the authors point out that the jury may still find for defendant if the evidence
is such that there is no reason to choose plaintiff’s hypothesis over theories
favoring the defendant. They view that result as implicit in the plaintiff’s
burden of proof.110
Given the controversy over the use of mathematical models in
evidence, Pardo and Allen address some likely objections from probability
theory. Fact finders rarely, if ever, apply comprehensive Bayesian models,
so controversy between advocates of quantitative models and advocates of
alternative approaches tend to focus on whether the quantitative models can
demonstrate the behavior of ideal fact finders, or whether they have
normative implications for fact-finding or the law of evidence.111 Ideal fact
finders, or whether they have normative implications for fact finding or the
105

See Pardo & Allen, supra note 3, at 227, 246.
See GILBERT HARMAN, THOUGHT 164–68 (1973).
107
509 U.S. 579, 593 (1993).
108
It seems very likely that Pardo and Allen meant this term to include opposing evidence
that is offered in a case-in-chief rather than confining it to rebuttal examination.
109
Shorthand here for the party that bears neither burden of persuasion nor production.
110
Pardo & Allen, supra note 3, at 246–47. For a reason that is not clear, Pardo and Allen
say that the jury should find for defendant when the plaintiff’s hypothesis seems better than
the one defendant offered, but no more persuasive than others that favor the defendant,
because the plaintiff has the obligation to produce “sufficient evidence from which a
reasonable factfinder could differentiate among the potential contrasting explanations.”
Pardo & Allen, supra note 3, at 246–47 (emphasis added). That is almost certainly a
misstatement. Setting aside occasional baroque attempts to instruct on civil presumptions,
jurors do not enforce the burden of production as such, and a failure to offer sufficient
evidence would normally be addressed by a judgment as a matter of law or cognate motion.
111
Pardo & Allen, supra note 3, at 248.
106
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law of evidence.112
One set of objections concerns the question of aggregation since it is in
theory possible to formulate an infinite set of stories favoring one party or
the other. If one must select the best story, some Bayesians argue, any given
story may be little if any more likely than its closely related colleagues, while
a mathematical model can arithmetically combine the probabilities of all
stories that favor a particular viewpoint, and then conduct a comparison.113
Pardo and Allen point out, however, that substantive law and the actual
conflicts between the parties at trial help fact finders to identify differences
among stories that they can ignore for purposes of aggregation. If, for
example, one witness testifies that the plaintiff was wearing black on a dark
night, and another midnight blue, the difference would seldom matter if the
defendant could only be negligent if he could have seen the plaintiff.
Accordingly, each of those accounts would weigh in favor of the defendant,
since the black/midnight blue conflict would be both factually and legally
unimportant.114 Moreover, they point out that the Bayesian approach is
dependent on “explanatory considerations” because such considerations
guide the identification of circumstances that may bear on fact-finding, and
thus the choice of data that are to be included in a mathematical model.115
Professor Allen is one of the main champions of the conjunction
paradox argument116 against the Bayesian theory, so it follows that they
believe that the Pardo/Allen theory avoids the paradox. Under the Pardo/
Allen theory, once the fact finders have selected the best explanation of the
evidence, that explanation either includes and confirms the elements of a
claim or defense, or it does not. If it does confirm (or “instantiate”) the
elements, then the party bearing the burden of persuasion wins, otherwise, it
loses.117

112

Pardo & Allen, supra note 3, at 248.
Pardo & Allen, supra note 3, at 254–61 (discussing Richard D. Friedman, “E” is for
Eclectic:” Multiple Perspectives on Evidence, 87 VA. L. REV. 2029 (2001)); Richard D.
Friedman, Infinite Strands, Infinitesimally Thin: Storytelling, Bayesianism, Hearsay and
Other Evidence, 14 CARDOZO L. REV. 79 (1992); Dale A. Nance, Naturalized Epistemology
and the Critique of Evidence Theory, 87 VA. L. REV. 1551 (2001).
114
Pardo & Allen, supra note 3, at 229–30.
115
Pardo & Allen, supra note 3, at 253.
116
E.g., Ronald J. Allen, A Reconceptualization of Civil Trials, 66 B.U. L. REV. 401, 407
(1986).
117
Pardo & Allen, supra note 3, at 231–34.
113
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Bayesian theory, they argue, requires that the court be aware of all
possible explanations for the evidence so that the probability of the
explanations will add up to 1.0.118 Pardo and Allen point out that parties at
trial behave otherwise, often seizing on the best explanation in their favor,
possibly due to the fear that proffering a large number of explanations would
suggest to the fact finder that none of them had support. They argue that
“the standard problem” for trials is not the difficulty of accumulating and
aggregating all of the stories favoring the parties. Instead, they think that
resolving cases in which one would quantify the probability of the
plaintiff’s119 story as less than .5, but substantially greater than the
probability of the defendant’s. To use their example, suppose that the
probability of the plaintiff’s case is .4 and the defendant has two defenses,
which each have a probability of .1. A Bayesian approach, they argue, would
require a defense verdict, because the probability of plaintiff’s case would
not exceed .5. As they conceive of it, the Pardo/Allen theory requires that
the plaintiff win, because plaintiff’s explanation would be the best.120
4. Pardo and Allen on the Implications of the Pardo/Allen
Theory
Pardo and Allen contend that clarifies standards of persuasion because
(i) it is a better description of trial processes than probabilistic models are,
(ii) is consistent with the best current research on jury processes, (iii) does
not produce the conjunction paradox “and [iv] allows the standards to fulfill
their function of distributing errors among the parties.”121
In light of jurors’ use of inference to the best explanation, they believe
that procedures for testing the sufficiency of evidence such as summary
judgment or directed verdict are vital. Assuming that the moving party does
not have the burden of persuasion, such motions pose the question of whether
there is sufficient evidence to allow the jury reasonably to infer that the
118

I am not sure what Professors Pardo and Allen mean in this regard. In their favor,
Bayesian models typically assume that P(A) and P(not-A) sum to 1.0. On the other hand,
given constraints of time and cognitive resources, it seems doubtful that any advocate of
Bayesian models is likely to argue that the probability of all of the explanations that jurors
must consider must sum to 1.0.
119
Assuming that the burden of persuasion is on the plaintiff.
120
Pardo & Allen, supra note 3, at 256–57. After that point, Pardo and Allen argue that
the Pardo/Allen theory gives a better account of probative value than does a Bayesian model,
relying on their analysis of an illustration from Kahneman and Tversky. Pardo & Allen, supra
note 3, at 257–61. It is an interesting point but does not seem to have any implications for the
burden of persuasion that the remainder of their argument does not suggest. On Kahneman
and Tversky’s research program in general, see, for example, Peter M. Todd, Fast and Frugal
Heuristics for Environmentally Bounded Minds, in BOUNDED RATIONALITY: THE ADAPTIVE
TOOLBOX 51, 52–55 (2001).
121
Pardo & Allen, supra note 3, at 261–62.
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aggregate explanation in favor of the non-moving party could be the better
explanation.122 To put the summary judgment standard in Pardo and Allen’s
terms “a judge ought to grant such a motion only if a jury would have to find
one side’s explanation more plausible than the other side’s explanation.”123
With respect to Pardo and Allen’s interpretation of the preponderance
test, the authors accept that “[w]hen you have considered all the evidence in
the case, you must be persuaded that it is more probably true than not true,”
as correct in theory.124 They note, however, that jurors seldom receive
further guidance about the preponderance test. Jurors, they believe, compare
explanations in fact-finding. In that light, Professors Pardo and Allen hold
that the courts should clarify civil jurors’ task by telling them “to select the
best explanation of the evidence (or the most plausible version of the litigated
events) and that something has been proven by a preponderance of the
evidence if it is part of their selected explanation or version of events.”125
IV. RESEARCH ON PROBLEM-SOLVING, THE STORY MODEL AND
ALTERNATIVE VIEWS OF ABDUCTION AS SOURCES OF
DESCRIPTION
Professors Pardo and Allen argued that their theory reflects jurors’
actual decision-making much more than probability-based accounts do.126
Not surprisingly, they believe that it has significant explanatory and
normative implications as well.127 There is significant agreement (although
hardly unanimity) that jurors do not behave as decision-makers following a
comprehensive Bayesian model would. The Pardo/Allen theory seems to be
a better description of jury behavior, if only because it takes as an implicit
premise that jurors can make good decisions without hearing and assessing
all possibly relevant evidence or all conceivable explanations.
122

Or, the only plausible explanation if the non-moving party is the prosecution in a
criminal case. Pardo & Allen, supra note 3, at 262–63. Pardo and Allen’s text refers to
“devices like summary judgment” as testing the sufficiency of “the explanation that the
moving party has provided.” Pardo & Allen, supra note 3, at 262–63. That must be a mistake
because summary judgment and analogous motions test the adequacy of the nonmoving
party’s evidence, and jurors can consider explanations that they formulate, in the aggregate
with whatever the non-moving party may offer. Moreover, if summary judgment focused on
the moving party’s explanation and the non-moving party did not bear the burden of
persuasion, all that party would have to show to avoid summary judgment is that a reasonable
jury might conclude that the moving party’s aggregate story was no better than the nonmoving party’s.
123
Pardo & Allen, supra note 3, at 265–66.
124
Pardo & Allen, supra note 3, at 266, (quoting FEDERAL CIVIL JURY INSTRUCTIONS OF
THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT 34).
125
Pardo & Allen, supra note 3, at 267.
126
Pardo & Allen, supra note 3, at 225–26. See generally, Ronald J. Allen, The Nature
of Juridical Proof, 13 CARDOZO L. REV. 373, 413–20 (1991).
127
Pardo & Allen, supra note 3, at at 239–46.
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The Pardo/Allen theory seeks to describe jurors’ behavior primarily in
terms of a philosophical theory of reasoning under uncertainty—inference to
the best explanation. That is not, however, to argue for a rigid distinction
between philosophy and empirical research. Indeed, when analyzing
reasoning under conditions of uncertainty, it is impossible to draw clean
distinctions among the roles of philosophy, cognitive science, psychology
and other social sciences.128 My suggestion, indeed, is that analysis of the
preponderance standard needs a heavier measure of the teachings of
empirical research on problem-solving than the Pardo/Allen theory includes.
Reconsidering the Pardo/Allen theory in light of that research leads to a
somewhat different view of the preponderance standard, and of the
justification for enforcement of sufficiency of the evidence standards
through summary judgments and judgments as a matter of law.
Professor Harman, who first advanced the concept of inference to the
best explanation, later likened it to the practical reasoning process of
“satisficing,” rather than maximizing or optimizing.129 “Satisficing” is the
term for choosing “an alternative that meets or exceeds specified criteria”
when “it is impossible to optimize, or where the computational cost of doing
so seems burdensome.”130 Constraints on jurors’ time, knowledge, access to
evidence and cognitive capacities mean that jurors (or the legal system itself)
can only satisfice in the resolution of issues of fact—they cannot hold out for
perfection. That is not to say that if they can achieve improvement, or even
seeming perfection, without wasting cognitive resources, they should not do
so. Whenever the benefit of expending resources outweighs their costs—
including opportunity costs—the fact finder should expend them. That may
include formulating stories of their own. At the same time, however, when
there is nothing they can do to increase the comprehensiveness of the
evidence or explanations they can consider, jurors’ experience as decision
makers in everyday life may suggest to them that they lack information that
they should have before taking a particular action, i.e., entering a particular
verdict.
The discussion in this section will begin with a discussion of constraints
on decision-making resources, and the cognitive strategies and default rules
that we use to make good decisions despite those constraints. Professors
Pennington and Hastie developed the story model some years ago. Their
research concluded that jurors use stories or narratives as strategies for
128

See, e.g., JUDGMENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY: HEURISTICS AND BIASES (Daniel
Kahneman, Paul Slovic & Amos Tversky, eds. 1982); NICHOLAS RESCHER, COGNITIVE
ECONOMY: THE ECONOMIC DIMENSION OF THE THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE (1989); PAUL
THAGARD, COMPUTATIONAL PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE (1988).
129
GILBERT HARMAN, CHANGE IN VIEW: PRINCIPLES OF REASONING 68 (1986).
130
See HERBERT A. SIMON, MODELS OF BOUNDED RATIONALITY: EMPIRICALLY
GROUNDED ECONOMIC REASON 295 (1997).
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organizing, understanding, and assessment of evidence, despite cognitive
constraints. Pennington and Hastie’s research on that use of stories, which
Pardo and Allen suggest serve the function of explanations in the Pardo/
Allen theory,131 suggests that the Pardo/Allen theory’s view of the
preponderance test may place excessive constraints on both judges and
jurors. Moreover, some research on inference to the best explanation
suggests that the Pardo/Allen theory focuses too narrowly on specific
alternative explanations at the expense of the possibility that fact finders may
regard the explanations or evidence on offer as insufficient to support a
judgment as serious as the one they are asked to make.
A. Stories, Cognition, and Confidence in Judgment
We use what one might call cognitive strategies to organize and
evaluate information that bears our decisions, in order to make good
judgments in light of the constraints on human memory and the limitations
on the time and material resources that we can devote to various issues.132
Research on cognition developed a theoretical construct called a schema.
Schemata depict the organization of knowledge in memory.133 When we
receive new information, schemata help us understand it by reflecting our
131

Pardo & Allen, supra note 3, at 225 n.3, 235 n.35.
For example, chess players’ advantage over relative novices lies in their ability to
isolate critical aspects of a position, rather than in some superhuman extension of mental
capacity. E.g., Herbert A. Simon & William G. Chase, Perception in Chess, in 1 MODELS OF
THOUGHT, 386, 386–87, 402 (Herbert A. Simon ed. 1979). Chess masters even seem to
organize their memory for the position of the pieces in ways that reflect actual gameplay,
resulting in improved memory of actual positions. Herbert A. Simon & Michael Barenfeld,
Information Processing Analysis of Perceptual Processes in Problem Solving, in 1 MODELS
OF THOUGHT at 371. Even Deep Blue, the extremely powerful chess computer that defeated
Kasparov could not have been victorious if programmers had not written strategies in its
program to limit the number of possible outcomes, i.e., the amount of evidence, it would
evaluate before making a move. DANIEL HILLIS, THE PATTERN ON THE STONE: THE SIMPLE
IDEAS THAT MAKE COMPUTERS WORK 83–87 (1998). Conversely, human players may rely
on computers to their detriment. In particular, a player who has memorized a set of computergenerated moves can find his position suddenly falling apart because he does not understand
the principles that motivated the moves.
Where problems are more complex, strategies are even more important, and brute
processing power may be of relatively little help. For example, in the game of Go, “humans
still reign,” because there are so many more possible positions in a game of Go. HILLIS at 87.
The number of possible positions in Go after two move-and-response cycles is more than 16
times the number of possible positions in chess after three such cycles. See Callen, supra
note 24, at 1265 n. 108. Human Go masters’ cognitive strategies allow them to find good
moves in limited time despite constraints on their cognitive resources, without assessing all
of the possible moves. Supercomputers programmed with simple search strategies such as
the ones that Deep Blue employed have not been victorious at Go, despite their vast
computational capacity. HILLIS, supra note 132, at 87.
133
Micheline T.H. Chi & Robert Glaser, Problem-Solving Ability, in HUMAN ABILITIES:
AN INFORMATION-PROCESSING APPROACH 227, 241 (Robert J. Sternberg ed. 1986).
132
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memories of normal sequences of events, objects, the roles of persons in
similar contexts and frequent situations, which we can use to comprehend
new situations. When information satisfies preconditions for the operation
of a schema, sometimes called “slots,” the schema is activated, and it
suggests a decision, or an action such as searching for a piece of evidence
that may be critical, or even formulation of a new schema.134 It may be more
difficult for decision-makers to reach good decisions when a schema is only
a very general guide. In some cases, when the schema is too general, or the
actor chooses an inappropriate one, it may be impossible to reach a
conclusion.135 The stories that Pennington and Hastie discuss are essentially
the products of schemata, that is, of cognitive strategies.
1. The Story Model
With respect to the preponderance standard, the most salient among
cognitive strategies for allocating limited resources effectively136 is the story
model. (Particularly relevant to the Pardo/Allen theory, Professors Hastie
and Pennington have even referred to the story model as an example of
“Explanation-based Decision Making.”)137 Jurors seem to use strategies that
psychologists call the “story model” to organize the evidence they receive
and to evaluate the parties’ contentions.138 Pennington and Hastie note that
cognitive psychologists believe that comprehension of any sort of
communication “is inherently a constructive process, even for the simplest
discourse.”139 In that light, some process of formulation and utilization of
stories may be inevitable for any trier of fact.140 In his study of the role of
narrative and intelligence, Professor Schank found that:
In the end all we have, machine or human, are stories and methods
of finding and using those stories. Knowledge, then, is
experiences and stories, and intelligence is the apt use of
134
Chi & Glaser, supra note 136, at 241–42. One way “of describing the weight of
evidence is to say that it increases with the quality and importance of the slots which evidence
fills in the schema.” Craig R. Callen, Second-Order Considerations, Weight, Sufficiency and
Scheman Theory: A Comment on Professor Brilmayer’s Theory, 66 B.U. L. REV. 715, 723
(1986).
135
Chi & Glaser, supra note 132, at 242.
136
See CHRISTOPHER CHERNIAK, MINIMAL RATIONALITY (1986); ROGER C. SCHANK, THE
CONNOISSEUR’S GUIDE TO THE MIND (1991) and Paul Thagard, Explanatory Coherence, 12
BEHAVIORAL & BRAIN SCI. 435 (1989).
137
Reid Hastie & Nancy Pennington, The O.J. Simpson Stories: Behavioral Scientists’
Reflections on The People of the State of California v. Orenthal James Simpson, 67 U. COLO.
L. REV. 957, 957 (1996).
138
See, e.g., Pennington & Hastie, supra note 23.
139
Pennington & Hastie, supra note 23, at 523, n.11.
140
See, e.g., JOHN JACKSON & SEAN DORAN, JUDGE WITHOUT JURY: DIPLOCK TRIALS IN
THE ADVERSARY SYSTEM 217–21 (1995) (use of a model to explain judicial fact-finding).
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experience and the creation and telling of stories. Memory is
memory for stories, and the major processes of memory are
creation, storage, and retrieval of stories.141
Information about the events in suit is a crucial ingredient for story
formation, but not the only one. Jurors also utilize knowledge about similar
events and “generic expectations about what makes a complete story (e.g.,
the knowledge that human actions are usually motivated by goals).”142 In
addition to the evidence offered at trial, they will make inferences to “fill out
the episode structure” of the story—whether suggested by parties or on their
own initiative.143 Individual jurors use pre-existing knowledge, new
information and inferences to construct one or more narratives, which they
use in reaching their verdict.144 If jurors could not rely on the organizational
structure and links to prior experience that stories provide, the sheer quantity
of information that jurors receive and the “disconnected” manner in which
they receive it would make the evidence “unwieldy.”145
The story model takes as a premise that jurors’ use of stories in
everyday life gives them the knowledge they can employ to assess the
“completeness of the evidence, or the extent to which a story has all its
parts.”146 “Missing information, or lack of plausible inferences about one or
more major components of the story structure will decrease confidence in
the explanation.”147 The research concluded that each juror constructs a
story to account for the evidence (or “best” story if she constructs
alternatives) is the basis of her verdict.148 One should not read that to say
that jurors will necessarily skate on thin narrative ice.
According to the story model, jurors who believe that a particular aspect
of a story necessary to establish a claim or defense lacks adequate support
will rely on the default rule and find against the party with the burden of
proof.149 If, on the other hand, the evidence makes jurors confident about
141

ROGER C. SCHANK, TELL ME A STORY: NARRATIVE AND INTELLIGENCE 16 (1995).
Pennington & Hastie, supra note 23 at 522.
143
Pennington & Hastie, supra note 23, at 527.
144
Pennington & Hastie, supra note 23, at 522–23.
145
Pennington & Hastie, supra note 23, at 523.
146
Pennington & Hastie, supra note 23, at 527.
147
Pennington & Hastie, supra note 23, at 528.
148
Hastie & Pennington, supra note 137, at 959–60.
149
Pennington & Hastie, supra note 23, at 530–31. Jurors will similarly decide in favor
of the default if the story does not coincide with one or more elements of the claim or defense.
(“We allow for the possibility that the best story is not good enough or does not have a good
enough fit to any verdict option and, therefore, a default verdict would have to be available.”)
Id at 531 n. 24; Nancy Pennington & Reid Hastie, The Story Model for Juror Decision
Making, in INSIDE THE JUROR: THE PSYCHOLOGY OF JUROR DECISION MAKING 192, 201
(1993).
142
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their judgment, and fills in necessary elements of the story, they may reach
a verdict by comparing the likelihood of stories.150
While the story model holds that development of a story or explanation
precedes the jury’s decision, it is possible for the jurors to go through a
number of cycles of story formation before reaching a final verdict. In such
a situation, the juror’s tentative decision may influence the final story
formation.151 Regardless, story formation continues through the trial, and
during jury deliberation.152 In contrast to the Pardo/Allen theory, the story
model theory does not assume that the jurors will construct at least one
explanation in favor of each party, although it does recognize that jurors may
construct more than one story and pick the best.153
2. Oblique-Stories
As Professors Pennington and Hastie conceive of them, stories may
explain the origin or value of the evidence without directly showing how a
crime, or central events in controversy, occurred. That is, they may be
designed to discredit the opposing evidence. For example, in discussing the
O.J. Simpson case, Professors Hastie and Pennington discuss two stories that
the defense advanced to account for some or all of the evidence without
giving an explanation of events leading to the death of Nicole Simpson or
Ronald Goldman. The first explanation was that the investigators
prematurely concluded that Simpson was the murderer and were motivated
to frame Simpson. The second was that LAPD forensic investigators simply
bungled evidence collection.154 One might call those stories “obliquestories,” that is, explanations of the evidence focusing on how the opposing
party developed items of evidence in a manner that is not, strictly speaking,
logically inconsistent with any ultimate fact that the opposing party alleged.
One test of the quality of a descriptive theory is whether it “saves the data,”
150
Nancy Pennington & Reid Hastie, Evidence Evaluation in Complex Decision-Making,
51 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOLOGY 242, 245, 254 (1986).
151
Pennington & Hastie, INSIDE, supra note 149, at 201–02.
152
Pennington & Hastie, INSIDE, supra note 149, at 201–02. Pardo and Allen agree that
story formation may continue through the trial. Pardo & Allen, supra note 3, at 234. It follows
that their references to the “self-evidencing” nature of explanations are somewhat misleading.
(For examples see Pardo & Allen, supra note 3, at 233, 235.) Similarly, their claim that
evidence is “relevant if it is explained by the particular party offering the evidence” is flawed.
If explanations are under construction as evidence is offered, evidence must be relevant if it
confirms or weakens an existing explanation or could lead jurors to trigger the formation of a
new story.
153
Pennington & Hastie, supra note 23, at 531 n.24; Pennington & Hastie, INSIDE, supra
note 149, at 201. Professors Vidmar and Hans quote transcripts from the Arizona jury study
that tend to suggest that jurors constructed only one story in their deliberations. See, e.g.,
NEIL VIDMAR & VALERIE P. HANS, AMERICAN JURIES: THE VERDICT 135–40, 184–87, 292–95
(2007).
154
Hastie & Pennington, supra note 137, at 966–67.
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that is, whether it accounts for the empirical phenomena.155 Regarding
oblique-stories as stories that the trier should compare to narratives that
include the ultimate facts could require jurors complying with the Pardo/
Allen theory to act in a way that is inconsistent with the theory.
The use of oblique-stories in the story model suggests a flaw in the
Pardo/Allen theory as a descriptive theory. The Pardo/Allen theory holds
that the stories jurors may consider include stories they formulate (in part
from scraps of the parties’ stories, but clearly with some material or
imagination of their own). Hastie and Pennington say that accounts of the
evidence that depict it as fabricated or flawed count as stories. Those two
points seem to add up, at a minimum, to the conclusion that, in deciding
whether any one story is better than the others, jurors should consider doubts
they have about the evidence or the explanation that the parties did not raise.
If such doubts form part of a story that the jurors might consider the best one,
then the Pardo/Allen theory’s requirements for a preponderance mean little
more than limiting the competing accounts that jurors may consider on
behalf of the non-burden bearing party to theories that jurors can articulate
to themselves. That is, where a preponderance is more likely than not, the
Pardo/Allen theory might limit the stories that jurors can consider on behalf
of not to articulated explanations in favor of that party. At most, it would
suggest that the burden of persuasion requires that evidence and explanations
in favor of the burden-bearing party be (i) more likely in the aggregate than
those explanations articulated in favor of the non-bearing party, and (ii)
sufficiently comprehensive to overcome reluctance to abandon the default
rule stemming from absence of evidence or doubts about the quality of the
explanations in favor of the burden-bearing party.
B. How Theories of Explanation Can Account for Lack of
Confidence
An inference to the best explanation is often called abduction, a term
that Professors Pardo and Allen use as well.156 Umberto Eco, whose
scholarship includes work on abduction, suggests that when we use
abduction to create an explanation of facts, as is usually the case in litigation,
we must also engage in meta-abduction, to ask whether the explanation we
imagine matches up with the real world as we know it.157 Regardless of our
155

See Pardo & Allen, supra note 3, at 243 (discussing work of Bas van Fraassen).
WALTON, supra note 74, at 34; Pardo & Allen, supra note 3, at 228. That is not to say
that equating them is universal, nor that everyone accepts the distinction between, e.g.,
enumerative induction and inference to the best explanation. Pardo and Allen equate
abduction and inference to the best explanation and distinguish between enumerative
induction and abduction, and possible differences among the theories do not seem to be
important here.
157
Umberto Eco, Horns, Hooves, Insteps: Some Hypotheses on Three Types of Induction,
156
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cognitive interests, we must ask whether we consider the explanation and its
supporting evidence adequate for action.
Detectives are rewarded by society for their impudence in betting by
meta-abduction, whereas scientists are socially rewarded for their patience
in testing their abductions. Naturally, in order to have the intellectual and
moral force to test, and to ask for new tests, and to entertain stubbornly an
abduction before it has been definitely tested, scientists also need metaabduction. Their difference from detectives stands in their refusal to impose
their beliefs as a dogma, in their firmness not to repudiate their motivated
conjectures.158
John Josephson argues that, in order for inference to the best
explanation to work well, it is important to consider the exhaustiveness of
the set of explanations to which we compared the eventual winner.159 His
position is that before we decide that the superiority of explanation Ei, as
compared to explanations Eii-En, warrants taking Ei to be true or acting on it,
we should consider whether the group Eii-En exhausts the alternatives. To
take an example from Conan Doyle, through Sherlock Holmes, “It is an old
maxim of mine that when you have excluded the impossible, whatever
remains, however improbable, must be the truth.”160 That assumes that the
search for other evidence and explanations has been sufficiently thorough to
make us confident that “whatever remains” is true, or at least an acceptable
basis for action.
In particular, Josephson considers it important that the decision maker
comparing explanations include two special sorts of stories. The first is what
he calls the “noise” hypothesis, that all of the evidence is incorrect, or just
noise.161 “[I]t may be that what seems to require explanation is merely
coincidence misperception, miscategorization, fraud, perjury . . . or some
similar phenomenon. Sometimes the data should be ‘explained away’ rather

in THE SIGN OF THREE: DUPIN, HOLMES, PEIRCE 198, 207, 215–20 (Umberto Eco & Thomas
Sebeok eds. 2002).
158
Id. at 220.
159
John R. Josephson, On the Proof Dynamics of Inference to the Best Explanation, in
THE DYNAMICS OF JUDICIAL PROOF: COMPUTATION, LOGIC AND COMMON SENSE 287, 293
(2002).
160
Arthur Conan Doyle, The Adventure of the Beryl Coronet, in THE ADVENTURES OF
SHERLOCK HOLMES 476 (The Floating Press 2008). The idea might have come down from
Poe. See explanatory notes in THE ADVENTURES OF SHERLOCK HOLMES, supra, at 390. Conan
Doyle repeats the point a number of times. E.g., ARTHUR CONAN DOYLE, THE SIGN OF FOUR
29 (n.d.) (ebook) (“How often have I said to you that when you have eliminated the
impossible, whatever remains, however improbable, must be the truth?”).
161
John R. Josephson, On the Proof Dynamics of Inference to the Best Explanation, in
THE DYNAMICS OF JUDICIAL PROOF: COMPUTATION, LOGIC AND COMMON SENSE 286–93
(Marilyn MacCrimmon & Peter Tillers, eds., 2002).
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than explained.”162 What I referred to earlier as oblique-stories in the
Simpson case would fall into this classification.
The second of Josephson’s “special” explanations is really more of a
meta-explanation. That sort of hypothesis would posit that the set of
explanations that the decision maker is considering rely on past experience,
and as a result may be inadequate to explain the current situation, which is a
new possibility. A trier with little or no experience may fail to make
sufficient allowance for that lack of experience and jump to conclusions. A
case-hardened fact finder, on the other hand, may be overconfident and
prematurely limit the alternatives he or she is considering. In assessing the
degree to which an unspecified new explanation may be better than the extant
ones, it may be possible to estimate the strength of the potential new
explanation by analogy to other situations in which the trier was able to form
a new explanation, and by assuming that the new explanation would account
for current anomalies in the evidence.163
Professor Thagard similarly said that his theory of explanatory
reasoning needed to be “enriched by taking into account judgments about the
evidence and availability of hypotheses” and that in dealing with novel
problems a prudent decision maker might suspend acceptance of what might
be the only explanatory hypothesis. He suggested that the decision maker
might, in fact, entertain a sort of “place-holder hypothesis” as competition
for the only fully developed candidate hypothesis.164
In a response to a related article by Professor Pardo, Professor Laudan
argued that to qualify as an acceptable “best” explanation, an explanation
must not only be better than any competitor, but must “exhibit a high degree
of coherence with background beliefs, . . . must be internally consistent, . . .
should explain different kinds of facts, . . . must be simple, and so on.” In
the absence of those traits, he argues, inference to the best explanation does
not justify any inference except possibly agnosticism on the factual issues in
question.165

162

Id. at 293.
Id. at 293–94. Judge Posner notes that juries help to mitigate judges’ tendency to use
short cuts based on their experience to reach decisions. POSNER, supra note 35, at 350–51.
164
Paul Thagard, Defending Explanatory Coherence, 14 BEHAV. & BRAIN SCI. 745, 745–
46 (1991).
165
Laudan, supra note 15, at 304–05. Laudan does, however, seem to agree with
Professor Allen’s earlier relative plausibility theory with respect to the preponderance
standard. “Under current rules, if the plaintiff has a better story than the defendant, he must
win even when his theory of the case fails to satisfy the strictures required to qualify his theory
as the best explanation.” Laudan, supra note 15, at 304–05.
163
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Eco’s, Thagard’s, and Josephson’s arguments suggest that inference to
the best explanation requires decision-makers to consider not only whether
the specific stories in favor of one party are better than those in favor of the
other, but the extent to which the consideration of explanations is sufficiently
exhaustive. In Pennington and Hastie’s terms, one might think of that
judgment of exhaustiveness as a factor in one’s confidence in the specific
stories. To put the point another way, Eco, Josephson, Thagard and the story
model all suggest that the jury should decide in favor of the party that does
not have the burden of persuasion when the burden-bearing party’s story is
simply not good enough, even if it is better than the story of the burdenbearing party—who might have offered little or nothing. Studies of
cognition and the Court’s jurisprudence on the sufficiency of the evidence in
civil cases seem to agree. Moreover, burdens of proof and rulings on the
sufficiency of the evidence suggest that standards more stringent than the
Pardo/Allen theory’s preponderance test have social benefits that judicial
implementation of the Pardo/Allen theory would not.
C. The Utility of Burdens and Sufficiency Tests
1. As a Guide for Jurors
In addition to the cognitive strategies that yield stories, our decisionmaking strategies include defaults or ceteris paribus principles.166 Such
rules help us allocate those resources efficiently in at least three ways.167
First, they simplify inferences about the empirical world which we must
draw from information at hand by focusing our attention on critical points—
the conditions under which the default rule no longer applies. Second, given
a particular state of knowledge, they help us decide whether additional
information is important, and to limit our search for that information in our
memory or in the world. Third, given our inferences and information about
the empirical world, and about the possible costs and benefits of various
actions, they help us decide which actions to take.

166

I meld together here, with default rules, a number of constructs including “fast and
frugal heuristics,” (Gerd Gigerenzer & Peter M. Todd, Fast and Frugal Heuristics: The
Adaptive Toolbox, in SIMPLE HEURISTICS THAT MAKE US SMART 12–18 (Gerd Gigerenzer &
Peter M. Todd, eds. 1999)); “rule-based realizations” of “q-morphisms” (J. HOLLAND, K.
HOLYOAK, R. NISBETT & P. THAGARD, INDUCTION: PROCESSES OF INFERENCE, LEARNING AND
DISCOVERY 46–47 (1986)), and frames with defaults (M. MINSKY, THE SOCIETY OF MIND
243–52 (1986)). See generally, Callen, Adjudication, supra note 29; Callen, Cognitive
Science, supra note 39.
167
See Callen, Adjudication, supra note 29, at 480–81; Callen, Cognitive Science, supra
note 39, at 1118, 1120–21.
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The burden of proof standards168 that lawmakers establish help to define
fact finders’ task by serving as default decision-making standards for the
fact-finding function. They require fact-finders to make one particular
decision unless the burden-bearing party provides the requisite quantum of
evidence for a fact-in-issue, which may trigger another. By isolating a few
critical variables, those facts-in-issue or elements on which the applicability
of rules turn, they simplify the fact-finder’s task. At the same time, focusing
the fact-finder’s task more narrowly helps lawmakers, courts or legislators
to promote predictable results.169 Isolating the critical factual inquiries also
helps lawmakers to condition rules on the facts they consider most critical,
and to establish a default in favor of what they consider the generally
desirable outcome.170 Not to put too fine a point on it, courts and legislatures
in formulating legal criteria make the judgment that the factual preconditions
of that rule describe a point at which the enforcement of the rule has social
utility that other preconditions would not. In that light, society has an interest
in accurate and predictable determination of whether those preconditions
exist.171 Finally, burdens of proof help organize disputes where multiple
rules are involved. For example, rule R may apply unless party P offers
quantum of evidence Q of facts F1-F4. If P does, in fact, offer the evidence,
then R applies unless opponent O offers quantum of evidence Q of facts F5F8, and so on.172
The argument for the comparative standard implicitly ignores the extent
to which human decision-makers who think P’s story is more plausible than
D’s, might still hesitate to rely solely173 on the difference in the stories.
While relying on the better story might lead to the correct decision in many
cases, where evidence for any story is thin, in particular when it is thin given
the importance of the matter at hand,174 we might well hesitate to rely on the
relative superiority of P’s story. Applying that idea in the context of

168
Including both burdens of persuasion and production, as well as summary judgment
standards, which are functions of the burden of persuasion. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby,
Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 253–55 (1986).
169
See, e.g., Callen, Adjudication, supra note 29, at 483–85.
170
See, e.g., Callen, Adjudication, supra note 29, at 483–85.
171
E.g., POSNER, supra note 35, at 341.
172
See, e.g., Callen, Cognitive Science, supra note 39, at 1120–21. See the discussion of
the St. Mary’s case, infra notes 192 and accompanying text for an example of such an
allocation.
173
This reservation is important because one might also choose to rely on a default rule
that would ordinarily operate in A’s favor.
174
See Ronald J. Allen, Mark F. Grady, Daniel D. Polsby & Michael S. Yashko, A
Positive Theory of the Attorney-Client Privilege and the Work Product Doctrine, 19 J. LEG.
STUD. 359, 388 (1990) (suggesting that the social interest in the accurate application of rules
warrants use of resources in litigation, i.e., makes the accumulation of evidence socially
useful. Litigation is not merely a stakes-dividing device.).
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litigation, jurors might hesitate to abandon a default standard until they had
enough information indicating that the balance of utilities tipped in favor of
a decision for P.175
Professors Pardo and Allen might argue that courts and fact-finders
have no valid interest in examining the completeness of evidence, or the
exhaustiveness of the explanations available, so there may be no reason for
a fact-finder to apply any standard other than pair-wise comparison.176 No
one doubts that jurors will often conclude that the parties’ presentations are
comprehensive, or at least adequately representative. The Pardo/Allen
theory holds that we should instruct jurors to rely on their pair-wise
comparisons, not that we should allow them to do so. That argues that jurors
should set aside some of the lessons of their cognitive experience, even
though the likelihood that they will rely on those lessons relates to an
important justification of the jury—their ability to bring everyday experience
to bear on questions of fact.177
Social utility may require more a standard more exacting than a
comparison of stories, theories, or explanations, particularly given the rather
vague nature of The Pardo/Allen theory’s concept of instantiating an element
of a claim.178 The incentives that parties in a given action have to gather
evidence, and to formulate stories or arguments, may not correspond to the
societal benefit of increasing the amount of information, or of refraining
from applying a particular rule in the absence of further information. The
parties may have only a small amount at stake or may hesitate to present
evidence with uncertain implications for their interests.179 As a general rule,
the parties have no interest in gathering evidence to vindicate broad social
norms or to see to it that outcomes at trial are consistent. Usually, their
interest is limited to their own dispute.180 Thus, the courts, in common law
175

One may argue that terms such as “enough” or “sufficient” do not describe a quantum
of evidence with adequate precision. Allen, supra note 44, at 1106. Given, though, that (i)
computational intractability inhibits the use of mathematical or logical description to model
human thought processes and (ii) questions of the adequacy of evidence can arise in differing
contexts, it is difficult to sharpen those terms. See Allen, The State of Mind Necessary for a
Judicial Verdict, 13 CARDOZO L. REV. 485 (1991) (“No logical algorithms can capture, and
thus guide very precisely, juror decision-making, . . . with the exception of formal systems
such as Euclidean geometry.”).
176
Cf. Allen, supra note 2, at 428.
177
See, e.g., Sioux City & Pac. Ry. Co. v. Stout, 84 U.S. 657, 664 (1873); Pattern Civ.
Jury Instr. 5th Cir. 2.18 (2014). Cf. Pardo & Allen, supra note 3, at 40 (“[J]urors are necessary
to provide the background knowledge to make contextual judgments about the strength of
competing explanations and to suggest new ones.”).
178
See Pardo & Allen, supra note 3, at 31–34.
179
Callen, Adjudication, supra note 29, at 487. See POSNER, supra note 35, at 349 (“[T]he
private benefits of searching for evidence may exceed or fall short of the social benefits.”).
180
Callen, Adjudication, supra note 29, at 487. See POSNER, supra note 35, at 349 (“[T]he
private benefits of searching for evidence may exceed or fall short of the social benefits.”).
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and interpretive functions, have good reason to use sufficiency tests more
exacting than those the comparative standard entails. Jurors, concerned
about their own interests as members of a broader society, and relying on
their own cognitive standards, have similar reasons to be concerned about
the adequacy of evidence before reaching a verdict.
Legal rules themselves reflect judgments about the need to consider
adequacy of evidence, even in everyday decision-making. The reasonable
person standard in, for instance, negligence law, reflects the need to
apportion cognitive resources in light of the task at hand—to exercise
reasonable care. Professor Cherniak points out that the reasonable person
standard requires persons to commit cognitive resources, to endeavor to
obtain information, to the extent warranted by the potential risk and its
likelihood.181 It follows that one can make, and that ordinary people often
do make, judgments about the adequacy of evidence, rather than relying
exclusively on the better of two or more stories as the Pardo/Allen theory
would have it. An account of reasoning which includes judgments about the
adequacy of evidence is indispensable to any understanding of rationality
which accommodates an understanding of human thought processes and yet
assumes that interpersonal standards are meaningful.
2. Sufficiency Tests and Errors of Law
We have been considering the effect of limited cognitive resources on
the jury’s role in fact finding. The judicial system likewise has limited
resources: time, personnel, money, and the human capacities of judges and
jurors. Moreover, to the extent the court considers the effect of its decisions
on the other human and economic resources of the society, the allocation of
those resources182 is constrained not only by their absolute limits, but also by
the conflicting demands on the resources. Those resources can be devoted
to the production of goods and services, or to other activities which may lead
to greater societal benefits than would the resolution of conflicts in a judicial
forum. Directed verdicts and summary judgments limit the expenditure of
resources in on-going litigation,183 as do other devices for early disposition
of litigation.
Judicial procedure in civil disputes, including evidentiary rules, is the
means by which courts organize data about disputes for resolution of those
disputes in accord with the applicable legal rules, setting general criteria for
state action through adjudication,184 not merely a method for conflict
181

CHERNIAK, supra note 136, at 102–03.
Professor Lempert points out that unnecessary litigation costs are deadweight losses.
Lempert, supra note 32, at 470.
183
Lempert, supra note 32, at 470..
184
See John H. Leubsdorf, Constitutional Civil Procedure, 63 TEX. L. REV. 579, 594–96,
182
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resolution as the Pardo/Allen theory suggests. Unless one looks at the
court’s role in fact-finding as part of its role in applying and interpreting rules
of law,185 it is difficult to make sense of common law adjudication, or for
that matter, interpretation of rules and statutes. Each requires the court to
decide whether the facts in a case fit a particular rule, or whether the facts
are sufficiently analogous to precedent or the pre-conditions of the rule or
statute to require or allow the court to apply the pre-existing principle.
Directed verdicts and summary judgments are two of the procedural
means by which courts decide that a party’s evidence is simply not good
enough to trigger, or prevent, the application of a rule. Directed verdicts and
summary judgments set a threshold, in terms of the non-moving party’s
ability to satisfy the burden of persuasion, for measurement of the accuracy
of the non-moving party’s case against the information in society at large.
In other words, they require that the courts see that facts have a certain
closeness of fit with the premises of rules and statutes before applying them.
Courts use burdens of persuasion and production to refine and interpret
rules of law. Whenever the courts accept a rule, statute, or interpretation
thereof as a valid prescription for their action, the prescription must
necessarily be based on assumptions about the way events normally occur in
the world.186 The court must make such assumptions in order to focus its
effort, and the litigation, on determining whether the critical triggering
conditions for sanctions exist. The allocation of burdens of proof enables
the court to implement its interpretation of the rule to fit the world—by
making default assumptions about the nature of events or evidence thereof.
It is those assumptions, among others,187 on which the court relies in
assigning burdens of proof. The allocation of burdens of proof, particularly
burdens of production, allows the court to conserve decision-making
resources for the abnormal or problematic case. When the court seeks to
create or reinforce incentives for particular behavior, it has a further interest
603 (1984). Cf. Owen Fiss, The Social and Political Foundations of Adjudication, in ROBERT
M. COVER, OWEN M. FISS & JUDITH RESNICK, PROCEDURE 219, 222 (1988) (Structural
litigation which enforces public values tends to abandon dispute resolution model of
procedure).
185
Of course, a court can formulate a new rule. Although not completely distinct from
interpretation or application of rules, that possibility does not seem to affect the argument, so
I have set it aside.
186
Consequently, they have valid reasons, in some situations, to refuse to allow verdicts
to be based on some proffers of statistical evidence.
187
On the state’s interest in accurate enforcement, see, e.g., Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S.
418, 426 (1979). Predictability is desirable for another reason—to establish an expectation
that the legal system will predictably apply the incentive in the future, which in turn makes
incentives more effective. Cf. ROBERT AXELROD, THE EVOLUTION OF COOPERATION 112–17
(1984) (In iterated prisoner’s dilemma simulation, most effective strategy is not the first to
deviate from mutually beneficial course—unwillingness to be first avoids unnecessary
conflict).
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in promoting accuracy and predictability for substantive reasons, to see that
the incentives are properly allocated.188
The courts, in that light, have an interest in seeing that the party who
contends that the courts should apply rules in that party’s favor, action which
affects the allocation of extra-judicial resources, has sufficiently proven the
elements of those rules. Accordingly, as lawmakers and agents of the state,
the courts have an interest in promoting accuracy in enforcement.189 They
also have an interest in promoting consistency of enforcement, to clarify
incentives for actors in society at large to avoid the acts which give rise to
evidence which, in turn, can result in conviction or liability.
D. Cognition, The Pardo/Allen Theory, and the Court’s View of Fact
Finding
1. The Fact Finder’s Story in St. Mary’s
I do not doubt that jurors in many civil cases use one or more of the
parties’ stories to a great extent in understanding and assessing evidence.
Moreover, it seems likely that some jurors assume that each party has put
forward the best explanation of the evidence that is in its own favor, and
refrained from constructing or adapting a story on their own initiative.190
Fact finders do, however, formulate their own stories to explain the
evidence. For example, suppose that plaintiff, an African-American, brought
an action alleging that his former employer discriminated against him on the
basis of race in discharging him from employment. Defendant offered a
neutral explanation for the discharge under the McDonnell-Douglas line of
cases, that plaintiff failed to discipline his subordinates adequately. In
188
See, e.g., Crispin Wright, Wittgenstein’s Rule-Following Considerations and the
Central Project of Theoretical Linguistics, in REFLECTIONS ON CHOMSKY 255 (A. George ed.
1989). For example, William H. Page, The Chicago School and the Evolution of Antitrust:
Characterization, Antitrust Injury and Evidentiary Sufficiency, 75 VA. L. REV. 1221, 1257–
74 (1989) points out the effect of the Chicago School model in antitrust law on questions of
characterization of behavior, antitrust injury and evidentiary sufficiency. Communication in
general requires that speakers or authors on the one hand, and audiences on the other, share a
large number of assumptions about the empirical world. Otherwise, the audience would not
be able to understand the content of the communication. See DAN SPERBER & DEIRDRE
WILSON, RELEVANCE: COMMUNICATION AND COGNITION 38–51 (1986).
Edmund M. Morgan, Some Observations Concerning Presumptions, 44 HARV. L. REV.
906, 910–11 (1931), points out that other, sometimes conflicting, rules of thumb can affect
the fixing of the burden of persuasion. “These respectively make it fall upon (1) the party
having the affirmative of the issue, (2) the party to whose case the fact in question is essential,
(3) the party having peculiar means of knowing the fact, and (4) the party who has the burden
of pleading it.” The point in the text is not that the court always relies on a particular principle
in allocating the burdens of persuasion or production. It is, rather, that burdens of production
and persuasion are important for accuracy in fact finding and application of legal criteria.
189
See POSNER, supra note 35, at 340–41; Leubsdorf, supra note 184, at 596–97.
190
See Pardo & Allen, supra note 3, at 234 n.30.
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addition, it showed that two African-Americans sat on the employee board
that approved disciplinary action against plaintiff, and that the number of its
African-American employees remained constant. Nevertheless, the plaintiff
offered evidence that led the fact finder to conclude that the neutral
explanation (firing for misconduct) was false, given that other employees
who failed to discipline subordinates received less severe penalties. Under
those circumstances, could the fact finder find that the discharge was nondiscriminatory?
Readers familiar with Title VII jurisprudence will note the
hypothetical’s resemblance to St. Mary’s Honor Center v. Hicks.191 There,
the District Court held that plaintiff failed to prove by a preponderance that
racial discrimination was the motivation for plaintiff’s discharge192 rather
than personal hostility to him (which the defendant did not offer as an
explanation for the discharge). While the court recognized that disbelief of
the defendant’s explanation would tend to show intentional
discrimination,193 it reasoned that, even if the trier thought the employer was
lying about the neutral explanation, such a conclusion would not
automatically preclude the trier from finding that there was another
nondiscriminatory reason for the discharge.194
We do not know all the details of the trial, but St. Mary’s seems to be a
good example of a case in which the fact finder worked out a story on his
own, at least to a significant extent. Although they have not said so, Pardo
and Allen would be very likely to accept St. Mary’s as a situation in which
the trier developed an explanation of his own for the evidence, and thought
it was at least as good as the one that the plaintiff offered. Nevertheless, it
does demonstrate a situation in which the judge as trier of fact found the
explanations offered wanting, and so formulated one of his own.
Comparing St. Mary’s to the Pardo/Allen theory, one might pose the
following hypothetical. Suppose that jurors applying the preponderance
standard regarded explanations in favor of each party in a civil dispute as
possible, and the plaintiff’s as best, but ultimately thinner than they would
rely on in their own lives. Should the preponderance standard require them
to find in favor of the plaintiff? The Pardo/Allen theory seems to say yes.195
As a descriptive matter, this does not seem to save the data. In particular, it
is very difficult to square with current practice in regard to motions for
191

509 U. S. 502, 508 & n.9 (1993).
Hicks v. St. Mary’s Honor Ctr., 756 F. Supp. 1244, 1252 (E.D. Mo. 1991).
193
St. Mary’s, 509 U.S. at 511; see also Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods. Inc., 530
U.S. 133, 148–49 (2000) (evidence sufficient to find employer’s explanation to be a pretext,
together with evidence showing a prima facie case of intentional discrimination, can be
sufficient to support a finding of age discrimination).
194
St. Mary’s, 509 U.S. at 520–21.
195
E.g., Pardo & Allen, supra note 3 at 246–47, 267–68.
192
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summary judgment and judgment as a matter of law.
2. Celotex, Reeves and The Pardo/Allen Theory
In Celotex Corporation v. Catrett,196 the Court held that a movant for
summary judgment who did not bear the burden of persuasion need not
produce any affidavits in support of her contentions of fact, but, instead, may
obtain summary judgment
after adequate time for discovery and upon motion, against a party
who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence
of an element essential to that party’s case, and on which the party
will bear the burden of proof at trial. . . . “[T]h[e]standard [for
granting summary judgment] mirrors the standard for a directed
verdict under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 50(a).”197
In Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods, Inc.,198 the Court considered
whether the district court correctly refused to enter a judgment
notwithstanding the verdict under Federal Rule 50(a) after a plaintiff’s
verdict in an age discrimination action. In upholding the district court’s
judgment and reversing the court of appeals, the Court said that, when a trial
judge assesses whether the nonmoving party’s evidence was sufficient to
support a finding in its favor on
a motion for judgment as a matter of law, the court should review
all of the evidence in the record. In doing so . . . the court must
draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmoving party,
and it may not make credibility determinations or weigh the
evidence. . . . Thus, although the court should review the record
as a whole, it must disregard all evidence favorable to the moving
party that the jury is not required to believe.199
Neither Celotex nor Reeves seems to reflect a comparative approach to
the standard of proof. If the standard of proof asked whether the plaintiff’s
story was better than the defendant’s, then Celotex would require the
defendant to offer some affirmative evidence in support of its own motion.
Otherwise, with the exception of complete absence of evidence for the nonmoving party or certainty that the defendant’s story was right,200 a motion
196

477 U.S. 317 (1986).
Id. at 232–33 (quoting Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 250 (1986))
(brackets in original).
198
530 U.S. 133 (2000).
199
Id. at 150–51 (citations omitted).
200
Neither was the case in Celotex. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 320. In Catrett v. Johns-Manville
197
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for summary judgment without a showing of facts in favor of the moving
party would be completely pointless. On the other hand, suppose the Court
in Reeves had conceived of the burden of proof standard as comparative, that
is, as a test of whether a reasonable juror could consider the nonmoving
party’s explanation as better to any alternatives. It would have made no
sense to restrict the evidence that the district court could consider in favor of
the movant to evidence that the jury was required to believe. Evidence that
the jury was not required to believe might nevertheless be a potent ingredient
in a powerful story for the movant.
Of course, defendants or other non-burden-bearing parties who make
motions for summary judgment under Celotex may argue that the plaintiff’s
evidence is consistent with any number of stories. That still would not make
the defendant’s story any better—unless we think of defendant’s story as
“the plaintiff doesn’t have enough evidence to support a verdict.” There is
no reason to believe that the Pardo/Allen theory encompasses such a story.
So that possibility does not seem to give the Pardo/Allen theory any
sustenance.
3. When Evidence or Explanations Are Lacking
The Pardo/Allen theory contends that, in cases in which “neither party
offers a particularly plausible explanation of the evidence . . . because
neither side can explain key pieces of evidence,”201 the jury should resolve
the situation by asking what is the best explanation and ruling accordingly.
If there is no best explanation, the trier should find against the party with the
burden of persuasion.202 The authors contrast situations in which “there is
such a paucity of evidence that it can be explained in multifarious ways.”203
The Pardo/Allen theory requires that where, as in the first case, all
explanations are equally bad, the trier should find against the party with the
burden of persuasion.204
Further, analyzing what they seem to regard as a typical problem in
civil litigation, they say that, in cases in which the trier believes the
probability of the plaintiff’s205 story is less than .5, but still substantially
Sales Corp, 826 F.2d 33, 37–41 (D.C. Cir. 1987), the court of appeals held on remand that the
plaintiff submitted evidence sufficient to allow a reasonable jury to conclude that she satisfied
the burden of persuasion.
201
Pardo & Allen, supra note 3, at 237–38.
202
That assumes, of course, that at least one of the explanations of equivalent quality
favors each party.
203
Pardo & Allen, supra note 3, at 237–38.
204
Pardo & Allen, supra note 3, at 237–38.
205
Assuming that the burden of persuasion is on the plaintiff. Pardo & Allen, supra note
3, at 246–47, once again, argue that judgment should go for the defendant if the evidence does
not enable the jury to differentiate among explanations.

CALLEN (DO NOT DELETE)

2018]

8/10/2018 10:50 AM

SPOTTING A PREPONDERANCE

1561

greater than the probability of the defendant’s. Hypothesizing a situation in
which the trier believes the probability of the plaintiff’s case is .4 and the
defendant has two defenses, which each have a probability of .1, they argue
that the trier should find for the plaintiff. The Pardo/Allen theory requires
that the plaintiff’s more probable explanation prevail.206
Those arguments expose at least two different flaws in the Pardo/Allen
theory’s position of the burden of persuasion and sufficiency of the evidence.
The first flaw is the conflict between Pardo and Allen’s quantification of the
value of evidence and their criticisms of Bayesian models that yield
quantitative probability assignments for inferences at trial.207 In their work
on the Pardo/Allen theory and elsewhere they have argued that that fact
finders’ ultimate decisions cannot be a Bayesian personalist probability.208
For instance, an interpretation of Bayesian personalist theory to fit the burden
of persuasion test209 is not convincing because subjective probability
assumes that we can make calculations in our minds which are
computationally intractable.210 Accordingly, it is extremely unlikely that
there are mental states that correspond to their .4 or .1 probability
assignments.211
206
Pardo & Allen, supra note 3, at 256–57. After that point, Pardo and Allen argue that
inference to the best explanation gives a better account of probative value than does a
Bayesian model, relying on their analysis of an illustration from Kahnemann and Tversky.
Id. at 257–61. It is an interesting point, but does not seem to have any implications for the
burden of persuasion that the remainder of their argument does not offer. On Kahnemann and
Tversky’s research program in general, see, e.g., Todd, supra note 120 at, at 52–55.
207
Pardo & Allen, supra note 3, at 240 (“Even if the strength of a party’s total evidence
could be quantified”) & n.49 (citing Ronald J. Allen & Michael Pardo, The Problematic Value
of Mathematical Models of Evidence, 31 J. LEG. STUD. 36 (2007) for reasons why it cannot),
247–48 & n.70; Allen, Nature, supra note 126, at 376.
208
Allen, supra note 126, at 379–82.
209
At least insofar as we are concerned with fact-finder’s actions in real time, that is in
actual decision-making, rather than abstract hindsight. Real time decision-making seems to
be the only issue at hand here.
210
Allen, supra note 126, at 380 n.25 notes Professor Cherniak’s dramatic example.
Testing 138 logically independent propositions by the truth table method would take the
fastest serial computer imaginable longer than the “big bang” theory believes to be the life of
the universe to the present. See CHERNIAK, supra note 136, at 93–94 & n.13.
211
Professor Nance questions the strength of the computational complexity argument
against Bayesianism, that is, the argument that comprehensive Bayesian models would require
processing capacity that humans do not have. He notes that physicists use complex models
of physical systems, systems that do not have the intelligence to do the calculations
incorporated in the model. Dale A. Nance, Naturalized Epistemology and the Critique of
Evidence Theory, 87 VA. L. REV. 1551, 1600–02 (2001).
But Bayesian models of fact finding apply to mental states. Given the computational
demands of simply assuring that beliefs are logically consistent, there is no reason to believe
those states are analogous to numerical probabilities, at least in any way that would be useful
for a systematic prescription of deliberations in a practical amount of time. Claims of more
abstract utility should be viewed with caution. Professor Nance’s attempt to analogize human
thought to physical systems seems to break down.
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Similarly, all the conjunction paradox212 shows is that Bayesian models
do not fit very well with human application of multi-element rules. That
simply does not require formulation of a new comparative model of
inference. In other words, while inference to the best explanation is very
useful for understanding fact finding, there is nothing in the conjunction
paradox that requires us to stop appraising the adequacy of evidence before
we act, even if the theory on which we might act is the best we can come up
with at the moment. The conjunction paradox suggests rather strongly that
comprehensive Bayesian models of fact finding do not work well, but that is
all.
Suppose we set aside the numbers in Pardo and Allen’s thought
experiment in which the probability of plaintiff’s case is .4.213 That would
convert the experiment into one in which the fact finder would regard the
plaintiff’s explanation as more likely (or a great deal more likely) than the
theory of the party’s opponent, but also think of the fact finder’s uncertainty
as equally significant—plaintiff’s case and explanations of an unknown
nature each having a probability of .4 in the mathematical model.214 The
Pardo/Allen theory seems to implicitly assume that the party with the better
story is more likely to be right than its opponent, and so should win the
verdict, despite the uncertainty.
The Pardo/Allen theory¸ then, is clearly in conflict with research on
human cognition and abduction that suggest that decision makers may
validly adhere to default rules (such as finding in favor of the party that does
not bear the burden of persuasion) when evidence is too thin to justify a
different decision. Professors Pardo and Allen have referred to “distributing
errors evenly among the parties”215 as a norm in their favor. I understand216
that a premise of that argument is, essentially, the assumption that the parties’
arguments are representative, not only of explanations they have conceived,
but of those that they might conceive given enough time, wisdom, and
evidence. Then, the argument contends, the party whose story is most likely
is the one who deserves to win.217 On that basis, the Pardo/Allen theory
requires fact finders to decide in accord with the best explanation, ignoring
gaps in the information, even those that make jurors doubt the wisdom of
212

See Pardo & Allen, supra note 3, at 253–56.
See Pardo & Allen, supra note 3, at 256–57.
214
The remaining .4 in Pardo and Allen’s example if the parties’ explanations have a
likelihood of .4 for the plaintiff, and .1 for each of defendant’s two explanations. Under the
Pardo/Allen theory, the likelihood of the two defenses should be aggregated, given that they
are alternatives. Pardo & Allen, supra note 3, at 256.
215
Pardo & Allen, supra note 3, at 254 & n.100, 261–62; Ronald J. Allen, Factual
Ambiguity and a Theory of Evidence, 88 N.W. U. L. REV. 604, 614 (1994).
216
With help from a conversation with Professor Pardo.
217
Pardo & Allen, supra note 3, at 254 n.100.
213
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doing so. That will often be the case. That is, parties’ incentives will often
be sufficient to cause them to gather and offer enough evidence to produce a
result that is accurate—at least insofar as observers of litigation could be
expected to agree that a particular result was accurate.
Even so, there is no reason to believe that the parties’ presentations and
the jurors’ imagination must necessarily yield sufficient evidence or
explanations to be representative of the information they would have if the
substantial uncertainty were resolved. Parties have incentives to gather
information and formulate new hypotheses to the extent that their benefits
for the parties (primarily improvement of the likelihood of an outcome in
their favor) warrant the costs in resources. After they have done so, a large
gap in information may still remain. Jurors may sometimes be able to close
that gap with inferences, as in the St. Mary’s case, or in situations in which
they formulate an explanation that fills the gap. Their resources are
constrained, and the evidence is a further constraint, but the jury may
sometimes be able to evolve a new theory subject to those constraints,
without wasting resources. Where the gap in information is a gap that
reasonable inferences cannot close, the court should rule against the burden
bearing party on a motion challenging the sufficiency of the non-moving
party’s evidence. When it is a gap over which the fact finders are unwilling
to make a leap of faith, they should not come to a verdict in favor of the party
with the burden.
V. AN ALTERNATIVE
The primary goal of this paper has been to suggest that any theory of
the preponderance standard based on inference to the best explanation should
take account of empirical research on problem-solving and fact finding, and,
in that light, that the preponderance standard cannot be wholly comparative.
Even so, the discussions of empirical research and inference to the best
explanation in this article provide some underpinnings for an alternative to
the Pardo/Allen theory’s conception of the preponderance standard.218 It
seems appropriate then, in closing, to sketch that alternative, at least in a
preliminary fashion.
Research on human problem-solving—including the story model—
suggests that the preponderance standard for proof of element E requires that
the fact finder conclude that (i) E is more likely than not-E, given the
evidence in the record and the stories or explanations the fact finder is
considering and (ii) the possible disutility of finding E in the absence of
218

For related analyses, see Craig R. Callen, Rationality and Relevancy: Conditional
Relevancy and Constrained Resources, 2003 MICH. ST. L. REV. 1243; Craig R. Callen,
Simpson, Fuhrman, Grice and Character Evidence, 67 U. COLO. L. REV. 777 (1996); Craig
R. Callen, Hearsay and Informal Reasoning, 47 VAND. L. REV. 43 (1994).
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further information or explanations does not warrant reliance on the default
rule by finding for the party that does not have the burden219 are two points
about this alternative that seem particularly worth making at this point.
A. Optimization Is Not An Option
Admission and evaluation of evidence does have costs and benefits, and
the proposed explanation of the preponderance standard does refer to the
disutility of entering a verdict in the absence of further information. It does
not follow that courts or jurors can identify “the point at which marginal cost
and marginal benefits are equated,”220 and so apply part (ii) of the
preponderance test algorithmically. Nor will jurors know precisely whether
the gravity of possible errors warrants reliance on the default rule. It is
unlikely they, or we, can optimize in that fashion.
Certainly, benefits and costs are factors in the process of gathering and
assessing evidence. Assume that the correct verdict creates a social benefit
greater than any other response to the problem. Data may help one to gain
that benefit, but not without costs. Accumulation and evaluation of data
requires expenditure of material resources that the decision maker221 might
devote to other purposes, and also the expenditure of cognitive resources that
the decision maker might use for other purposes, such as resolving other
issues in the same dispute, resolving other disputes, or performing some
other function that may have a greater social utility.222 In addition, some
items of evidence that simply confuse the fact-finder may have negative
utility.223
In order to calculate the optimal amount (and nature) of evidence that
one should gather for a decision, one would need to know the values and
costs of gathering and evaluating individual items of evidence across a wide
variety of disputes and factual contexts. One would also have to calculate
the value of the opportunities lost if resources are devoted to evaluation of
that evidence. Considering all evidence that might bear on any one
problem224 (or trying to satisfy the prerequisites of Bayesian models) would
require a superhuman effort. Then calculating the costs and benefits of all
sorts of evidence, in all sorts of contexts, would require a dramatically
greater exertion.225
219

Craig R. Callen, Kicking Rocks with Dr. Johnson: A Comment on Professor Allen’s
Theory, 13 CARDOZO L. REV. 423, 431 (1991) (footnote omitted).
220
POSNER, supra note 35, at 339.
221
And parties, to the extent the procedural system is adversarial. POSNER, supra note
35, at 346–48.
222
See Gigerenzer & Todd, supra note 166, at 3, 11.
223
POSNER, supra note 35, at 386–89.
224
Callen, Conditional Relevancy, supra note 24, at 1260–64.
225
Gigerenzer & Todd, supra note 166, at 11. One might argue that the decision maker
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The theory of bounded rationality, which “takes into account the
cognitive limitations of the decision maker—limitations of both knowledge
and computational capacity” is of critical importance.226 That theory helps
to explain how decision makers can be successful despite the impossibility
of optimizing under constrained material and cognitive resources. In order
to make good decisions in light of their bounded rationality, humans need to
recognize familiar situations and crucial data, search for new data in ways
that reflect both benefits and costs of seeking data, and employ simple
decision rules to help them make decisions based on the critical data.227 In
other words, they use decision-making strategies, such as the story model.
Of course, reliance on cognitive strategies is not a guarantee of
infallibility. Decision-makers may select the wrong strategy for a particular
problem, misapply the correct strategy, or simply fail to understand the
problem ab initio. Or one might fail to absorb the lessons of prior experience
correctly, and so formulate a number of strategies that are ineffective.
In that light, advocates of approaches based on optimizing could argue
that their theories, at the least, establish aspiration levels, ideals at which we
should aim, even though we will never achieve them. Certainly, other things
being equal, there is no reason why we should not try to improve our
decisions and gain wisdom in the process. Yet, studies comparing decisions
made with simple heuristics and those that follow multiple regression (a
proxy for optimization) show that the heuristics may be more successful, at
only a fraction of the cost of regression.228
Jurors (and probably judges) will tend to believe that the parties have
put forward the best cases for their positions.229 On the other hand, jurors’
or judges’ experience may suggest that additional evidence should be
available if one party’s position is accurate. Experience may even teach that
the uncertainty remaining after the parties have presented their explanations
need only estimate the costs and benefits, but that argument fares no better. See SIMON, supra
note 130, at 296 (noting that the difficulty of “[s]olving these estimation problems” may be
as great, or greater, than the difficulty of trying to consider all data bearing on the matter in
question).
226
SIMON, supra note 130, at 291.
227
Gigerenzer & Todd, supra note 166, at 12.
228
Gerd Gigerenzer, et al., How Good Are Fast and Frugal Heuristics, in DECISION
SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY 81, 90–92 (James Shanteau, et al. eds., 1999) conclude that simple
heuristics are superior to multiple regression when the experiments require the strategies to
“learn” the value of data from one set of problems, and use what they have “learned” to solve
a different, although similar, set of problems. Bayesian networks are much more
computationally complex than simple heuristics or multiple regression, yet perform only
slightly better than a simple heuristic when asked to “learn” values of data from one set of
problems and employ those values to resolve a similar set. Id. at 98–100.
229
See ROBERT J. KLONOFF & PAUL L. COLBY, SPONSORSHIP STRATEGY: EVIDENTIARY
TACTICS FOR WINNING JURY TRIALS 22 (1990) (jurors will tend to believe parties introduce
their best evidence, and will not introduce evidence that is not important).

CALLEN_FORMATTED.DOCXCALLEN (DO NOT DELETE)

1566

SETON HALL LAW REVIEW

8/10/2018 10:50 AM

[Vol. 48:1517

(and jurors have tried to formulate some on their own initiative) requires a
decision in favor of the default. Even so, the limitations of jurors’ experience
and cognitive resources will generally not permit them to calculate (i) the
optimal extent to which the parties should produce evidence, or (ii) the
precise extent to which they should view under-producing parties’ claims
with skepticism. There is no argument here that jurors who rely on their own
cognitive strategies will be infallible, just that judges and jurors will make
better decisions if permitted to consider whether the evidence is sufficiently
complete to justify a departure from the default rule.
B. Employing ‘Story’ or ‘Explanation’ in Preponderance
Instructions
Instructing jurors in terms of explanations or stories, as Pardo and Allen
suggest, would be unlikely to make their task any easier. The Pardo/Allen
theory holds that the preponderance test requires that the jurors “select the
best explanation of the evidence (or the most plausible version of the litigated
events),” and that jurors should regard something as “proven by a
preponderance of the evidence if it is part of their selected explanation.”230
It seems quite likely that jurors do use the story model, or something
very much like it, to understand and assess evidence at trial. Accordingly,
telling them to reason in terms of stories seems unlikely to accomplish much
if jurors understand it as intended. It might even confuse them, since we tend
to assume that people communicating with us are striving to provide
information we do not already have.231 In that light, jurors might believe that
they are supposed to formulate a form of story that they otherwise might not,
or that the court was doing more than simply reassuring them that their
normal decision-making methods would suffice. Moreover, asking jurors to
select the best explanation of the evidence as a basis for their verdict would
seem to cry out for further instructions. In other words, while jurors are
likely to engage in some form of inference to the best explanation, they are
unlikely to think of it as such. A theoretical restatement of that process in
instructions might create confusion for some jurors that would outweigh any
improvement in other jurors’ decision making.

230

Pardo & Allen, supra note 3, at 266–67.
See DAN SPERBER & DEIRDRE WILSON, RELEVANCE: COMMUNICATION AND COGNITION
149–50 (2d ed. 1995); Callen, Conditional Relevancy, supra note 24, at 1284.
231
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CONCLUSION
This draft has focused on what seem to be flaws in the Pardo/Allen
theory. In so doing, it has devoted relatively little attention to the Pardo/
Allen theory’s utility. The authors’ achievement in developing a descriptive
theory of inference at trial grounded in a philosophical account of induction
is particularly noteworthy. Jurors may often behave as the theory predicts,
but the arguments for requiring them to do so seem to fall short.
The primary purpose of this paper has been to set out the reasons why
their comparative standard of proof in civil cases does not seem to be an
adequate description or an appropriate norm for resolution of issues of fact.
Empirical research on human decision making suggests that we take the
adequacy of the available evidence in deciding whether to apply a default
rule. Some analyses of inference to the best explanation agree. The
comparative approach is inconsistent with current jurisprudence on summary
judgment and judgment as a matter of law. In fact, the Pardo/Allen theory
does not square with the decision-making processes that Celotex and Reeves
require. It seems also to underestimate the social and cognitive utility of
burdens of persuasion and production.
One of the recurring arguments in the theory of evidence is whether
“ought” implies “can.”232 In other words, the issue is whether it makes sense
to set up standards, such as Bayesian models, when research suggests that
humans cannot adhere to them, and that striving to do so could well be
counter-productive. Inference to the best explanation is an “ought” that
reflects important aspects of the “can” that the story model and research on
problem-solving suggest. It may be possible for us to set aside arguments
that jurors must only compare stories in coming to a verdict—that they
should not otherwise ask themselves whether evidence and explanations are
adequate to support a verdict in favor of the party bearing the burden of
persuasion. If we can do so, and implement inference to the best explanation
in conjunction with the story model and research on human decision making,
we will be well on our way to developing a model of inference at trial that is
better than anything currently on offer. And we might even settle the
meaning of “preponderance of the evidence.”

232
See Mike Redmayne, Rationality, Naturalism and Evidence Law, 2003 MICH. ST. L.
REV. 849, 860–66; Ronald J. Allen & Brian Leiter, Naturalized Epistemology and the Law of
Evidence, 87 VA. L. REV. 1491, 1554–55 (2001).

